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ABSTRACT 
In 1893 historian Frederick Jackson Turner first presented his frontier thesis to a group of 
historians at the World’s Columbian Exposition, a fair honoring the four-hundredth anniversary 
of Christopher Columbus’ expedition, in Chicago, Illinois. Since then, scholars have long 
debated the role that the frontier played in shaping the development of the United States. The 
Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s history, and, 
when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the development of the 
United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been recognized. Kentuckians 
found themselves at the forefront of a multifaceted struggle between the United States and 
Europe’s most powerful empires for control of the trans-Appalachian West. The manner in 
which Kentuckians interpreted and responded to the realities of daily life in the region shaped the 
foreign and domestic agendas of the developing United States and influenced the actions of 
foreign political representatives. This analysis of the Kentucky statehood movement, framed by 
the conventions themselves, reveals how Kentucky’s political leaders were shaped by, and often 
times influenced, national and international politics while carefully attending to their own local 
political agendas.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Such was the situation of this country twenty-two years ago. In this situation the people became 
politicians from necessity, not from choice. In this situation they commenced those public 
consultations, discussions and political transactions, which terminated in the ultimate 
independence of their country. These will be the subject of the following chapters.  
               –William Littell, Political Transactions, 18061  
William Littell, a legal historian born in New Jersey and raised in Pennsylvania, 
immigrated to Kentucky in 1801. He quickly immersed himself in politics and, following a brief 
stint practicing medicine in Mt. Sterling, was commissioned to write an account of the Kentucky 
statehood movement in 1806. Littell was hired by Federal Judge Harry Innes and a number of the 
state’s most well-known political leaders to refute claims alleging their involvement in the 
Spanish Conspiracy of twenty years earlier.2 Humphrey Marshall, a cousin of US chief justice 
John Marshall, was the primary architect of the accusations and frequently lambasted Innes in 
the Frankfort Western World. Innes soon brought libel suits against Marshall and the 
newspaper’s co-founder, Joseph Street. Political Transactions was released later that year. Littell 
carefully attempted to absolve Innes and his cohort of sympathizing with Spain by drafting a 
narrative of the statehood movement’s most defining moments. Marshall offered his response 
with the release of History of Kentucky in 1812. The work was decidedly partisan in nature and 
                                                          
1 William Littell, Political Transactions in and concerning Kentucky, from the First 
Settlement Thereof, Until It Became an Independent State, in June, 1792 (Frankfort, KY: 
William Hunter, 1806). 
2 Colonel James Wilkinson at least purported to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish 
empire in what became known as the Spanish Conspiracy. Wilkinson traveled to New Orleans 
and met with Louisiana governor Esteban Rodríguez Miró in August 1787. Wilkinson promoted 
Kentucky as a buffer zone for Spain’s valuable Mexican silver mines and promised to sway 
Kentuckians to the Spanish crown. Wilkinson, in return, requested a position within the Spanish 
government, a royal pension, and a western trade monopoly. See Andro Linklater, An Artist in 
Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson (New York: Walker, 
2009), 71–92; Jon Kukla, A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of 
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 121–33. 
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sought to vilify anyone that he believed played a role in the Spanish Conspiracy. Innes’ suit 
against Marshall ended in 1814 with a hung jury and was not settled until the following year 
when the two signed an agreement ending the case. Marshall later broke the agreement and 
ultimately got the last word when he published a revised and more vituperative adaptation of his 
work in 1824—eight years after Innes’ death.3  
The defining events of the Kentucky statehood movement, that encapsulated the lives of 
Marshall and Innes during the 1780s, and afterward became the subject of bitter quarrels 
between the two men, illustrate that Kentucky politics reached far beyond the frontier.4 The 
Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s history, and, 
when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the development of the 
United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been recognized. Kentuckians 
found themselves at the forefront of a multifaceted struggle between the United States and 
                                                          
3 John E. Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1992), s.v. “Littell, William;” Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, “Marshall, Humphrey,” in 
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, 609–10; Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Federal 
Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky, 1789–1816 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978), 46–47, 52–53; John Mason Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky: A Narrative of 
Public Events Bearing on the History of that State up to the Time of Its Admission into the 
American Union (Louisville: John P. Morton, 1889), 213–17; Lowell H. Harrison and James C. 
Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 158; 
William McClung Paxton, The Marshall Family, or a Genealogical Chart of the Descendants of 
John Marshall and Elizabeth Markham, His Wife, Sketches of Individuals and Notices of 
Families Connected with Them (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke, 1885), 80–82; “Harry Innes versus 
Humphrey Marshall: depositions, 1809–1815,” Reuben T. Durrett Collection on Kentucky and 
the Ohio River Valley, Durrett Cdx 206, Special Collections Research Center, University of 
Chicago Library, Chicago, IL (hereinafter Durrett Collection, UC); Littell, Political 
Transactions; Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, 2nd ed. (Frankfort, KY: S. Robinson, 
1824), vol. 1.  
4 Kentucky, Montgomery, and Washington counties were established on December 31, 
1776, when the Virginia legislature officially dissolved Fincastle County. Kentucky County 
largely encompassed the same area that the state of Kentucky would in 1792. The Kentucky 
district was formed in March 1783 and consisted of Fayette, Jefferson, and Lincoln counties. See 
Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 31–32, 52–53. 
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Europe’s most powerful empires for control of the trans-Appalachian West. The manner in 
which Kentuckians interpreted and responded to the realities of daily life in the region shaped the 
foreign and domestic agendas of the developing United States and influenced the actions of 
foreign political representatives. The debates at the Kentucky statehood conventions were 
likewise shaped by the national and international issues of the day, as Kentuckians wrestled with 
tough questions: should Kentucky separate from Virginia? Who would benefit from separation? 
How and when should independence occur? What should the new state government look like? 
Who should fill leadership positions? How would separation affect the local economy? These 
questions defined the Kentucky separatist movement and were quickly complicated by the many 
possibilities and differing viewpoints offered by Kentuckians.5  
The fate of the United States remained largely unsettled throughout the 1780s. Although 
American officials hoped to bring stability to the trans-Appalachian West through diplomacy, 
they were often at odds with one another and the region’s leaders about how best to accomplish 
that goal. Kentucky lay at the center of a complex competition between the British, Spanish, and 
regional Indian groups to halt US expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains. These groups 
hoped to stunt the growth of the United States and protect their regional interests by quashing its 
efforts to achieve sustained commercial and territorial development. The national government 
failed to implement basic measures that ensured the physical and economic well-being of its 
outlying populace, and many, as a practical alternative, began to call for the creation of an 
                                                          
5 Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic 
History,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 647–77; Kevin T. Barksdale, “Introduction: 
Kentucky and the Struggle for the Early American West,” Register of the Kentucky Historical 
Society 114 (2016): 291–302; Christopher L. Leadingham, “To Open ‘the Doors of Commerce’: 
The Mississippi River Question and the Shifting Politics of the Kentucky Statehood Movement,” 
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 114 (2016): 342.   
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independent western state. These individuals believed that their needs could best be addressed 
through localized government. Kentuckians assembled in convention ten times between 1784 
and 1792 to discuss the possibility of separating from Virginia.6 
Kentuckians spoke out against the misappropriation of surveying fees, called for the 
establishment of a western printer, supported protection for orphans and the poor, and identified, 
in addition to a number of other issues, problems with the court system. They disapproved of the 
lack of navigable roads, bridges, and waterways in the region despite the sizeable share of taxes 
that Kentuckians paid to the Virginia state government. Most importantly, however, Kentuckians 
sought protection from antagonistic Native groups and spoke out against their inability to mount 
offensive strikes against them. Some Kentuckians began to question the legitimacy of the 
American Revolution in the West and adapted the images, symbols, and rhetoric of the war to 
advocate separating from Virginia. The early statehood conventions centered on issues of land 
redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as delegates 
disparaged what they considered to be a distant and unresponsive state legislature.7 It was not 
until Spain closed the Mississippi River to US traffic in 1784 that the movement gained traction 
                                                          
6 Reginald Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776–1815 (Arlington 
Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1985); George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. 
Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Patrick Griffin, 
American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2007); Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American 
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
7 See John R. Van Atta, Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the 
Old Republic, 1785–1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), for an 
examination of US western land policies and their effect on the political, economic, and social 
development of the United States. 
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and began to be viewed as a North/South conflict, as legislators from Virginia sided with 
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river.8 
The Mississippi River played a vital role in the developing Kentucky commercial 
economy. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their goods to market and expected the 
national government to quickly negotiate the reopening of the waterway. The proposed 
Jay/Gardoqui agreement merely heightened tensions in the region when word spread that the 
settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five 
to thirty years. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive 
government, and some, such as Thomas Green of Louisville, threatened to take matters into their 
own hands. Even the ongoing debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were 
shaped by the arguments made by people in the West. Kentuckians questioned the rationale for 
the new government and believed the new system would make it easier for the Atlantic states to 
cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain. James Madison assured westerners that navigation 
rights to the river would become a national issue under the new government. He expected 
Kentucky delegates to play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to 
gain their support. Kentuckians did not actively participate in the debates, despite Madison’s 
prediction, and the convention approved the new government in June 1788. Kentucky officially 
                                                          
8 Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779–1792 (New York: 
Atheneum, 1972); Lowell H. Harrison, Kentucky’s Road to Statehood (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1992); Harrison and Klotter, A New History of Kentucky, 55–58; George 
Morgan Chinn, Kentucky Settlement and Statehood, 1750–1800 (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical 
Society, 1975); Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Three Virginia Frontiers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1940); Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky (Lexington, KY: John 
Bradford Press, 1960). See also Joan Wells Coward, Kentucky in the New Republic: The Process 
of Constitution Making (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979); Tachau, Federal 
Courts; Lowell H. Harrison, John Breckinridge: Jeffersonian Republican (Louisville: Filson 
Club, 1969); Fredrika J. Teute, “Land, Liberty and Labor in the Post-Revolutionary Era: 
Kentucky as the Promised Land” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988).  
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became a state on June 1, 1792. Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi 
River with the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty on October 27, 1795, and, by the late 1790s, a 
plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state.9 
Kentucky and its peoples clearly occupied an important space in the early American and 
Atlantic worlds. Kentucky’s political leaders were shaped by, and often times influenced, 
national and international politics while carefully attending to their own local political agendas. 
Historians of the frontier and early Kentucky have, however, been slow to recognize the 
important role that the state’s political leaders played in shaping the development of the United 
States and larger Atlantic world. Early accounts of Kentucky emphasized the state’s rich natural 
resources and promoted the region as an “agrarian promised land” waiting to be settled by self-
sufficient yeoman farmers.10 This characterization was widely accepted and perpetuated in the 
American public consciousness and shaped historical interpretation of both Kentucky and the 
frontier for decades to come. The United States soon expanded beyond the Mississippi River, 
and, by the late nineteenth century, writers began to reinterpret Kentucky’s regional identity as 
eastern instead of western. Kentucky, for those writers, was significant inasmuch as the state 
                                                          
9 Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 16, 21–22, 64–65; Herring, From 
Colony to Superpower, 32, 47–48, 70; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 40–45, 54–57; Stephen 
Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry 
Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 89–92. 
10 Craig Thompson Friend, “Introduction,” in Craig Thompson Friend, ed., The Buzzel 
about Kentuck: Settling the Promised Land (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 2. 
See, for example, John Filson, The Discovery, Settlement and Present State of Kentucke 
(Wilmington: James Adams, 1784), available online from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, at 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=etas (accessed 
February 25, 2017). See Friend, ed., The Buzzel about Kentuck, 1–22, for an insightful overview 
of Kentucky historiography.  
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ensured the perpetuation of America’s fundamental political and social institutions as the country 
expanded westward.11  
Historian Frederick Jackson Turner completely reshaped the study of American history in 
1893 when he presented his frontier thesis to a group of historians at the World’s Columbian 
Exposition, a fair honoring the four-hundredth anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ expedition, 
in Chicago, Illinois. Turner linked the development of American national character to the 
expansion of the frontier. He argued that the realities of life on the frontier reshaped traditional 
European beliefs and practices into a unique American identity that was continually refined as 
the frontier moved farther west. Turner, however, ignored the complex intercultural relationships 
that developed on and beyond the frontier, and, as a result, masked the true political instability of 
the trans-Appalachian West. Britain, Spain, and various Native American groups remained key 
players in the region well into the nineteenth century.12 
Historians have since rejected much of the Turnerian thesis and are now working to better 
situate the trans-Appalachian West in a critical, global context. Francois Furstenberg places the 
backcountry at the center of Atlantic world history between 1754 and 1815 in his article “The 
Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.” Furstenberg contends that, 
when viewed from multiple perspectives, the Seven Years’ War did not end in 1763, but, rather, 
continued with only minor breaks until 1815. This extended conflict, which the author has 
                                                          
11 Friend, ed., The Buzzel about Kentuck, 4–5. This premise was based on the “germ 
theory” articulated by Herbert Baxter Adams. Adams, who hoped to introduce scientific study to 
the discipline of history, believed that America’s most basic institutions were rooted in Anglo-
Saxon tradition. See, for example, Nathaniel S. Shaler, Kentucky: A Pioneer Commonwealth 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1885), available online at https://archive.org/details/ 
kentuckypioneerc00shal (accessed February 26, 2017).  
12 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in 
The Frontier in American History, ed. Frederick Jackson Turner (New York: Henry Holt, 1921), 
1–38. 
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labeled the “Long War for the West,” was fought at various points across the trans-Appalachian 
West. Furstenberg demonstrates that settler discontent and foreign intrigue in the region was a 
significant threat to US sovereignty as the nation struggled to assert its political and economic 
independence. Similarly, in The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815, Reginald Horsman 
identifies political independence, domestic security, commercial expansion, and territorial 
acquisition as the main driving forces behind US policy during this period and emphasizes the 
important position that the trans-Appalachian West held in relation to those goals.13 
Many authors have been able to demonstrate the importance of the trans-Appalachian 
West to the development of early American politics by examining the processes of identity 
formation and state making. Patrick Griffin argues in American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and 
Revolutionary Frontier that western settlers created their own notions of sovereignty and social 
order as a result of racism and an increasingly violent atmosphere. Griffin views the western 
frontier from a Hobbesian standpoint (civil society cannot exist without a government) and 
asserts that the frontier derived much of its powerful influence from the violent conflicts that 
erupted between Native Americans and westerners. The manner in which westerners responded 
to that atmosphere and the compromises that resulted with eastern leaders, the author explains, 
played important roles in shaping the developing national government. Andrew R.L. Cayton 
explores the development of regional identities in the trans-Appalachian West and concludes that 
regional tensions and competition for limited governmental resources sparked many of the 
western statehood movements. Historian Kevin T. Barksdale moves in a similar direction with 
                                                          
13 Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” 
647–77; Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic.  
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his analysis of the failed state of Franklin in The Lost State of Franklin: America’s First 
Secession.14  
This study builds upon existing scholarship that demonstrates the importance of the trans-
Appalachian West and, by extension, Kentucky, to the development of the United States and 
larger Atlantic world. The intersection of the Kentucky statehood movement and the politics of 
the early republic underscore a number of political, economic, and social issues that defined the 
domestic and foreign policies of the United States as the untested national government struggled 
to assert its political and economic independence in the years following the Revolutionary War. 
Kentucky’s political leaders played important roles in shaping the nation’s policies towards 
Native Americans, commerce and transportation, and territorial expansion. Kentuckians also 
played a critical role in reshaping the national government in debates concerning the ratification 
of the Constitution. The debates at the statehood conventions were likewise shaped by national 
and international issues, particularly Spain’s closure of the Mississippi River, further 
demonstrating the importance of viewing Kentucky, and the statehood movement, in a wider, 
transatlantic context.  
Chapter one begins by outlining the basic territorial claims that shaped British and French 
imperial policy in the trans-Appalachian West and highlights the contested nature of the region 
itself. Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural 
resources of the trans-Appalachian West, and the violent confrontations that ensued played an 
important role in unifying both groups. This section builds upon Patrick Griffin’s analysis of 
                                                          
14 Griffin, American Leviathan; Andrew R.L. Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the 
Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-
Appalachian West,” Journal of American History 79 (1992): 39–67; Kevin T. Barksdale, The 
Lost State of Franklin: America’s First Secession (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
2009). 
10 
 
frontier violence and self-sovereignty in American Leviathan to illustrate how notions of fear and 
Indian hating provided the impetus for the early Kentucky statehood conventions. Many 
Kentuckians believed that only an independent state could best secure the financial and military 
resources needed to ensure their protection and framed the movement in terms of an East/West 
divide. Kentuckians, by speaking out against the Virginia and US governments, shaped state and 
national policies concerning Native Americans and played an important role in identifying and 
critiquing the failings of the national government under the Articles of Confederation.  
  Chapter two opens on June 26, 1784, when Spanish officials closed the Mississippi River 
to US traffic. This section describes the importance of the river to the developing Kentucky 
commercial economy and builds upon the themes outlined by Reginald Horsman in The 
Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776-1815 to illustrate how the closing of the Mississippi River 
and the proposed Jay/Gardoqui agreement positioned Kentuckians at the center of the 
competition between the United States and Spain to control the trans-Appalachian West. Spain 
intended to use the backcountry desire to access the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with the United States. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and 
unresponsive government, and some hoped to leverage their allegiance to the United States in an 
attempt to improve their situation on the frontier. This section also suggests an important change 
in the framing of the statehood movement (from an East/West to North/South divide) after 
legislators from Virginia sided with Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the 
Mississippi River.  
Chapter three builds upon the previous chapter to illustrate how the national debates 
concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were shaped by the arguments made by people 
in the West. Many Kentuckians questioned the motivation behind the new system, believing that 
11 
 
the Atlantic states could more easily forfeit control of the Mississippi River to Spain under the 
new government. James Madison expected Kentucky delegates to cast the deciding votes at the 
Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to gain their support. Kentucky delegates did not 
actively participate in the convention debates, and, in the end, did not play the decisive role that 
Madison anticipated. Kentuckians, overall, however, played a significant role in shaping the 
development of the new government by joining fellow westerners in demanding a government 
that was attentive and responsive to their needs. This section also identifies how the ongoing 
national debates reciprocally shaped the Kentucky statehood movement. 
Chapter four outlines the final statehood conventions and identifies a number of 
important factors that determined what the new Kentucky government would look like as the 
state took shape. Kentuckians were particularly divided over which courts should hold 
jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. The right to hold slaves emerged as the most contentious 
issue discussed at the final statehood convention. Proponents of the institution argued that the 
Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the private property rights of slave owners. 
Convention delegates, in the end, voted to allow slaveholding in the new state, despite the efforts 
of an antislavery faction led by Presbyterian minister David Rice. Kentucky officially became a 
state on June 1, 1792, and a plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state by the 
late 1790s. The integration of political and economic systems bolstered the gentry’s foothold in 
the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky frontier. Slaveholders across the 
United States gained an important victory with the ratification of the 1792 constitution—
precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
“Such is our melancholy situation…To whom else shall we apply?” 
For while they see no vigorous & decided steps taken by Government to prevent the cruelties & 
Depredations of the Savages, they are apt to conclude as the reason, that those in Administration 
feeling nothing of their sufferings, are consequently indifferent to their Situation: they therefore 
wish for a separation, because they then expect that every one in power will be equally interested 
with themselves in securing a friendly Intercourse with their troublesome Neighbors.  
                                                 –Walker Daniel to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 178415 
Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural 
resources of the trans-Appalachian West. British officials struggled to maintain peace in the 
region following the close of the Seven Years’ War, and violent confrontations between 
Amerindians and Euro-American settlers became commonplace as the settlement and 
development of the trans-Appalachian West continued apace. Violent acts committed both by 
and against Native peoples unified western settlers in a way that no other did. Kentuckians began 
to look towards eastern governments and political leaders for assistance as the frequency of raids 
against frontier settlements intensified after the outbreak of the American Revolution. Many 
Kentuckians believed that an independent state would best be able to secure the financial and 
military resources needed to ensure their protection. The early statehood conventions centered on 
issues of land redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as 
delegates spoke out against the Virginia and US governments. Kentuckians, in so doing, shaped 
                                                          
15 Walker Daniel to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1784, in The Calendar of Virginia State 
Papers and Other Manuscripts, 9 vols., ed. Raleigh Edward Colston, Henry W. Flournoy, 
Sherwin McRae, and William Pitt Palmer (1875–1893; repr., New York: Kraus, 1968), 3:586–87 
(hereinafter The Calendar of Virginia State Papers). 
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state and national policies concerning Native inhabitants and played an important role in 
identifying and assessing the shortcomings of the Confederation government.16  
Into the West 
The wealth and natural resources of the trans-Appalachian West had long been contested 
by the British, French, Spanish, Cherokee, Delaware, Shawnee, and various other Amerindian 
groups who peopled the region. England laid claim to a substantial portion of the backcountry 
and, by extension, much of North America via the Virginia colony. In 1609, King James I of 
England extended the boundaries of Virginia westward to the Pacific Ocean and two hundred 
miles north and south of Old Point Comfort.17 England’s claim to the region was bolstered in 
1671 with the discovery of the New River, a tributary of the Kanawha River with headwaters in 
western North Carolina, by explorers Thomas Batts and Robert Fallam. The pair was dispatched 
from Fort Henry by fur trader Abraham Wood and followed the river to Peters’ Falls before 
claiming the Ohio River Valley on behalf of Great Britain.18  
Woods sponsored another expedition in 1673 in hopes of establishing trade agreements 
with outlying Native American groups. The voyage was led by frontiersman James Needham, 
and it was during this trip that the first detailed accounts of Kentucky and its Native inhabitants 
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were collected. France asserted control of much of the Ohio and Mississippi river valleys based 
upon the explorations of French explorers Jacques Marquette, Louis Joliet, and René-Robert 
Cavalier, Sieur de la Salle.19 The region was especially important to France because the valleys 
connected French Canada and Louisiana. The close of the Seven Year’s War (1754-1763) and 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763 changed the political makeup of the North American 
continent. Spain gained control of New Orleans and all French-held territory west of the 
Mississippi River while Britain acquired Canada and Spanish Florida. The subsequent 
restructuring of imperial governments affected the daily lives of thousands of Amerindians and 
Euro-Americans across the continent.20  
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An uneasy peace settled over the upper Ohio Valley as British officials focused on 
establishing peace with the Ohio Indians. However, territorial disputes, trade and diplomacy 
issues, and the fate of British captives quickly discouraged harmony between the two groups. 
Native societies were soon divided between those who sought peace and those who opposed the 
continued British advance into the region. Spiritual regeneration messages preached by Delaware 
prophet Neolin and echoed by Ottawa Chief Pontiac bolstered Native alliances and encouraged 
attacks against frontier settlements. The backcountry once again plunged into a state of chaos in 
early 1763 as Amerindian raids (precipitated by Pontiac’s siege of Fort Detroit) swept across the 
frontier. Larger British outposts such as Forts Niagara, Pitt (formerly Duquesne), and Detroit—
all recently acquired from the French—successfully endured long and bitter sieges. However, 
smaller strongholds scattered across the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry were quickly 
overtaken and destroyed by adept Amerindian warriors, leaving frontier settlers and their 
homesteads exceptionally vulnerable.21  
Fear of Native peoples characterized the lives of backcountry settlers long after the 
uprising was brought to a close. Amerindian raiding parties numbering upwards of sixty to one-
hundred men (divided into smaller groups) often simultaneously attacked multiple homesteads. 
The production of fear was their main objective. Attacks typically occurred during the daylight 
as settlers anxiously tended their crops (when the season permitted) and were the most exposed 
and vulnerable. Succinct, concurrent attacks against an entire area allowed Native raiders to 
quickly and efficiently capture as many people and livestock as possible—this was followed by 
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the burning of houses, crops, and barns. Amerindian raiders often capitalized upon the settlers’ 
fear by staging gruesome vignettes with the bodies of their most recent victims, mutilated and 
carefully positioned in highly visible locations, before reuniting with the larger party and 
withdrawing farther west. Settlers most feared violent home invasions that occurred during the 
night or at daybreak. These, however, were less common than daytime raids.22  
Such tactics terrorized backcountry settlers and bolstered for many a deep-rooted hatred 
of Native Americans. These sentiments cut across class lines as wealthy and poor westerners 
found common ground amidst a common enemy. Settlers began to look towards eastern 
governments and political leaders for support but were met with an unresponsive British 
government that was unable (or unwilling) to restore order in the West. Virginia, by the late 
1770s, extended west to the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio River into what became the 
Northwest Territory. Great Britain began to finance and coordinate raids against frontier 
settlements following the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. The new American government 
also failed to establish order in the trans-Appalachian West, and westerners became even more 
disenchanted by their inability to garner adequate resources and support. Some settlers simply 
became indifferent to the American Revolution, while others began to develop their own notions 
of self-sovereignty.23  
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Many westerners, as a practical alternative to unresponsive state and national 
governments, championed the formation of a frontier commonwealth. These individuals believed 
that an independent western state could quickly and efficiently address the social, economic, and 
political issues faced by its peoples through localized government. Proponents of localist ideals 
believed that power should be concentrated in state legislatures and denounced strong, 
centralized government. These individuals proved unwilling to uphold a compact with a national 
government that offered neither security nor economic prosperity to western citizens. A frontier 
commonwealth, most importantly, would allow westerners to develop and enact policies aimed 
at curbing Indian attacks. American officials carefully monitored the situation in the West, 
fearful that backcountry settlers could easily be enticed to secede from the union and join with 
either Great Britain or Spain—both often entertained the possibility of western secession.24 
The First Convention  
Violence characterized the daily lives of Kentuckians long after the official close of the 
American Revolution. Although no longer supplied and orchestrated as part of large-scale British 
operations, Indian attacks continued to menace the frontier well into the 1790s as the settlement 
and development of Kentucky continued apace. Kentucky attorney general Walker Daniel 
cautioned in May 1784 that the failure of the national government “to prevent the cruelties & 
Depredations of the Savages” encouraged discontent among the settlers and was the leading 
cause of separatist movements across the frontier.25 In November 1784, Lincoln County militia 
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colonel Benjamin Logan received intelligence that a group of Cherokee and Chickamauga 
raiders were threatening to advance upon the region.26 Logan called for westerners to assemble 
in Danville, the meeting place of the newly established Kentucky District Court, to discuss how 
best to approach the situation. Aware there was no time to contact officials in Richmond, Logan 
hoped to quickly assemble militia units and launch preemptive strikes against the raiding party. 
George Muter, Samuel McDowell, and Caleb Wallace, members of the eastern aristocracy and 
newcomers to the frontier, cautioned that any offensive action would be considered extralegal in 
light of current Virginia law. Someone recommended that the group petition the Virginia 
legislature for more flexibility in handling the Amerindian threat. Ebenezer Brooks, at that time a 
leading proponent of Kentucky statehood hoping to advance the interests of his cohort, asserted 
that the group should consider separating from Virginia. The motion was not seconded and the 
topic subsequently not opened for discussion. By the second day of the meeting, word spread 
that the Cherokee and Chickamauga raiders had merely been posturing and no longer posed a 
serious threat. Logan, nevertheless, called for an official meeting to consider the security and 
resource concerns of the region and to discuss the prospects of an independent Kentucky. The 
meeting was slated for December 27, 1784, and one representative from each militia company 
was supposed to be designated to attend the gathering. Harry Innes later recalled that “every one 
[sic] present saw the absolute necessity of calling together the wisdom of the District in a general 
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Council to take into consideration the then state of our detached and distressed Country.”27 
Kentuckians took their first major step toward statehood by calling for the official meeting and, 
at least for the moment, as Innes described, presented themselves as a unified assembly prepared 
to confront the Virginia government. 28   
The movement for statehood was shaped and propelled by diverse groups of settlers. 
Although they shared certain common interests, especially a desire for frontier defense, the 
statehood proponents were divided over several issues. There were no political parties in frontier 
Kentucky, but, for her 1972 book on early Kentucky politics, historian Patricia Watlington 
categorized the groups debating statehood into three distinct political parties: the partisans, court 
party, and country party. Watlington contends that these parties are related to, but distinct from, 
the Federalist and Republican parties that developed on a national level during the 1790s. 
Landless settlers formed the core constituency of the partisans, who looked to the national 
government for assistance when faced with an unresponsive state legislature. These men, 
commonly referred to as “rabble” by their opponents, called for a redistribution of western land 
and envisioned the Bluegrass as a region of opportunity far removed from Virginia’s social and 
political circles.29   
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The partisan-led separatist movement began in 1779 but lacked official leadership until 
1782, when land company agents began both to encourage and participate in the push for 
statehood. Non-Virginia land speculators argued that the region actually belonged to the US 
Congress and encouraged discontent among the backcountry populace as a way to secure title to 
large tracts of western land. John Campbell, a native Irishman and former Philadelphia trader, 
supported the congressional claim despite acquiring rights (via the Virginia claim) to four 
thousand acres near the falls of the Ohio River (present-day Louisville). Campbell believed that 
he and others could obtain thousands more acres if the Virginia claim was negated. In the spring 
of 1782, land company agents began circulating copies of Thomas Paine’s Public Good, which 
argued against Virginia’s claim to the region. “That the most extraordinary part of the whole is, 
that Virginia should countenance such a claim,” Paine explained.30 “For it is worthy of 
observing, that, from the beginning of the contest with Britain, and long after, there was not a 
people in America who discovered, through all the variety and multiplicity of public business, a 
greater fund of true wisdom, fortitude, and disinterestedness, than the colony of Virginia.”31 
Land agents also began to spread rumors in 1783 that Congress had declared the Virginia claim 
invalid, circulating a series of phony letters—purportedly written by congressional leaders—as 
proof. 32  
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Partisan leaders found petitioning to be their most effective recourse. Five petitions were 
forwarded to Virginia and four were sent to Congress between 1780 and 1784. Petitioners spoke 
against unjust land laws and the ineffectual district court and requested that Kentucky soon 
become a separate state. A June 1782 petition sent to the Virginia statehouse called for a 
redistribution of land and requested the formation of a better government or independence from 
Virginia. “Such is our melancholy situation—We fly to your house for redress, To whom else 
shall we apply? We know by experience that Kentucky has friends in your house, and we now 
call on them with an Importunity that becomes distressed Citizens to espouse the use of justice 
for us.”33 Watlington has suggested that the partisans were likely more cognizant of their 
political affiliation than the court or country parties, but maintains that their membership was 
never very stable—although it accounted for nearly fifty percent of Kentucky’s total population 
at the party’s height. Key members of the partisans included Ebenezer Brooks, a medical doctor 
and Presbyterian minister originally from Delaware, and land speculators Arthur Campbell and 
George Pomeroy.34  
Members of the court and country parties formed what Watlington describes as the 
“articulate center”—native Virginians and members of the gentry who saw themselves as the 
natural leaders of Kentucky.35 Court and country party members shared similar backgrounds and 
upheld comparable principles, but were largely divided along family lines and by personal 
quarrels. Unlike the partisans, both groups favored a constitutional separation from Virginia in 
order to prevent a redistribution of western land, and thus sought to position themselves in 
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leadership roles. Watlington contends that lawyers and judges, who came west as land cases 
proliferated and the western court system expanded in the 1780s, accounted for the majority of 
court party members. These men were well versed in the art of oral and written communication 
and were keenly aware of the political milieu in which they found themselves. Most of these 
gentlemen arrived in the backcountry too late to secure large tracts of land. They hoped to 
emerge as the political leaders of the region and imagined Kentucky as a manufacturing hub for 
much of the South and Southwest. Court party members saw the Mississippi River as the 
lynchpin of the burgeoning Bluegrass economy and expected to use the river to export their 
domestic manufactures. Thus, securing sustained and unrestricted access to both the Mississippi 
River and the Spanish port of New Orleans proved to be a primary concern for the party. 
Prominent members included John Brown, Harry Innes, John Fowler, Samuel McDowell, 
Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and Colonel James Wilkinson—each newly settled in the 
region.36 
 The country party was headed by Thomas Marshall, father of future US chief justice 
John Marshall. These men were mostly slaveholders who owned large plantations and hoped to 
recreate a planter culture in the West that mirrored that of the Virginia Tidewater. Country party 
members, unlike their court party counterparts, believed that a strong, centralized government 
would promote a stable economy. They were deeply loyal to the union and largely uninterested 
in Mississippi River trade, instead focusing on overland trade routes to the East. Robert 
Breckinridge, Robert Bullitt, John Edwards, Joseph Crockett, and the outspoken Humphrey 
Marshall formed the core leadership of the country party. Members of the country and court 
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parties, despite their differences, united to maintain the status quo in terms of class relations and 
spoke passionately against the partisan call for land redistribution, which reached its peak by the 
winter of 1783-1784. Violence committed both by and against Amerindian groups, ironically, 
cemented frontier settlers together in a way that no other issue did. Members of the court and 
country parties feared that Virginia’s lackluster approach to western defense meant the state was 
willing to forfeit its western land claims—making their Virginia-backed titles worthless. The 
partisans, conversely, were upset that many of them had fought in the Revolution to defend those 
very same claims and were left with little or no land. All three groups looked to the Virginia 
statehouse for redress.37 
Delegates attending the December 27, 1784, gathering were selected in the preceding 
months by members of their respective militia companies—a fairly democratic process for the 
day. It soon became clear that the partisans would have a slight advantage over their court and 
country party counterparts when the assembly met in Danville. William Fleming, who hailed 
from Lincoln County, was selected as the convention president and non-voting member Thomas 
Perkins was appointed as clerk on the opening day of the meeting. The group met as committee 
of the whole on December 29 to conduct an assessment of the district.38 Isaac Shelby was 
appointed chairman of the committee and on the next day Caleb Wallace presented a list of 
thirteen resolutions that had been compiled by a select committee formed the previous day. The 
resolutions outlined the most pressing issues faced by the western population. Topping the list 
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was a statement that addressed western security concerns—particularly, the inability of 
frontiersmen to mount offensive strikes against antagonistic native groups. The committee 
declared that an “Executive power” promptly be established in the district to authorize military 
operations in times of emergency.39 The remaining resolutions addressed a wide range of issues, 
including the misappropriation of surveying fees, problems with the court system, protection for 
orphans and the poor, horse breeding regulations, the adoption of stray animals, and the need for 
a western printer. 40 
The convention met in this format a number of times before it formally adopted a series 
of resolutions that mirrored those prepared by the sub-committee and presented by Caleb 
Wallace nearly a week earlier. Conspicuously missing from the list was a statement regarding 
militia laws or violent acts committed by Native groups. Most of the representatives believed 
that a vote should be taken and another convention held to ensure that they acted on behalf of 
their constituency. The second convention was slated for the fourth Monday in May 1785. 
Delegates agreed that twenty-eight individuals should be selected to attend the meeting and 
determined that representation in the convention would be based on population count to most 
accurately represent the general populace.41 Delegates to the second convention were to be 
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elected by popular vote during court days in April 1785; suffrage was not dependent upon 
property ownership. Fayette County was awarded eight delegates and Jefferson and Lincoln 
counties—allocated eight and twelve representatives, respectively—were subdivided into 
election districts. The group adjourned on Wednesday, January 5, 1785, after voting to send 
copies of the convention minutes to the highest ranking officer in each county “so that the 
Inhabitants at large may know what their deputies have done in considering the Grievances that 
came under their notice.”42  
The Second and Third Conventions 
Nelson County—home to large numbers of recent Maryland Catholic immigrants—was 
carved from Lincoln County by the Virginia legislature before the April elections in early 1785. 
The creation of another county posed a unique opportunity for the leader of the Jefferson County 
partisans—John Campbell. Campbell and the partisans expected members of the court party to 
vote against separation and feared that the statehood movement would be jeopardized without 
their support. Campbell suggested that members of the court party hoped to control the 
upcoming meeting by ensuring that the group held a majority of the convention seats. Campbell 
pointed to the restructuring of the delegate selection process as proof and convinced the local 
populace to elect twelve representatives from Jefferson County, rather than the eight allocated, to 
attend the convention. Moreover, he secured the election of twelve partisans from Nelson 
County—bringing the total number of delegates under his guise to twenty-four. Anticipating the 
arrival of a combined twenty representatives from both Lincoln and Fayette counties, Campbell 
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and the partisans expected to easily control the second statehood convention. Harry Innes wrote 
in May 1785 that “we shall have no Convention this month…Col. Campbell has marred the 
whole plan.”43 
The second convention opened on May 23, 1785, with only the Fayette and Lincoln 
County delegations in attendance; representatives from Jefferson and Nelson counties did not 
arrive until May 27. George Muter, Benjamin Logan, Samuel McDowell, Harry Innes, and Caleb 
Wallace were among the most notable court party members in attendance. James Wilkinson did 
not attend the second meeting because of an illness. Samuel McDowell and Thomas Todd were 
selected as convention president and clerk, respectively—positions the two held concurrently in 
all but the first and ninth conventions. Two significant steps towards independence were taken 
by members of the second convention, although neither directly resulted in the immediate 
formation of an independent Kentucky. On May 31, 1785, delegates agreed to petition the 
Virginia legislature for permission to form the state of Kentucky, which “ought to be taken into 
union with the United States of America, and enjoy equal privileges in common with the said 
states.”44 The petition read “that the remote situation of the district from the seat of government, 
together with sundry other inconveniences, subjects the good people thereof to a number of 
grievances too pressing to be longer borne, and which cannot be remedied whilst the district 
continues a part of the state of Virginia.”45 The delegates made it clear that Kentuckians would 
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no longer tolerate an unresponsive and removed government, maintaining that only the formation 
of an independent state would ameliorate their situation in the West.46 
Convention delegates also approved an address to the people of Kentucky that was later 
distributed to the district court clerks and affixed to the doors of each respective court house. The 
address largely mirrored the Declaration of Independence and was likely written by James 
Wilkinson in advance of the meeting.47 The author listed a number of the most common 
grievances lodged with the Virginia legislature, beginning with inadequate defenses against 
Native American raiding parties. “We have no power to call out the militia, our sure and only 
defence, to oppose the wicked machinations of the savages, unless in cases of actual invasion.”48 
The address also cited communication difficulties, differing commercial interests, a distant 
appeals court, the siphoning of western monies, and lack of a western executive power. The final 
portion of the address explained that convention delegates sought reassurance from the western 
populace before advancing the statehood movement. Elections were scheduled to take place 
during the July court days. Humphrey Marshall and other members of the country party, still 
fearing a redistribution of western land, continued to oppose statehood and saw the third 
convention merely as a ploy to allow James Wilkinson the opportunity to speak in favor of 
separation. Members of the court party likely hoped to control the third convention and position 
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themselves in leadership roles as their influence continued to grow. Representation in the 
convention would once more be determined by population count. Jefferson and Nelson Counties 
were each allocated six representatives. Fayette and Lincoln Counties were charged with 
selecting eight and ten delegates, respectively.49  
Delegates to the third convention arrived in Danville on August 8, 1785. Court party 
members filled the ranks of convention delegates, just as Humphrey Marshall and his cohort had 
feared. Those in attendance included James Wilkinson, Caleb Wallace, George Muter, Benjamin 
Sebastian, Harry Innes, and Benjamin Logan. Partisan leaders John Campbell and Ebenezer 
Brooks were notably absent from the meeting after failing to win their bids for reelection. 
Moreover, not a single member of the country party was in attendance—leaving the court party 
in full control of the twenty-six member convention.50 Much of the convention business was 
conducted in committee of the whole under the leadership of George Muter. Delegates 
unanimously agreed that separation was in the best interest of their constituents and resolved to 
apply for statehood. The resolution enumerated the oft-repeated list of injustices that plagued the 
West and called for an act of separation “honourable to both and injurious to neither.”51  
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James Wilkinson wrote a new petition based on the approved, but undelivered, document 
from the second convention.52 The address was more direct than the first but emphasized the 
patience and care that punctuated the movement. Convention delegates acted with only the 
“purest filial affection,” though they employed “the plain, manly, unadorned language of 
independence, supported by conscious rectitude.”53 “They [district settlers] have patiently waited 
the hour of redress, nor even ventured to raise their voices in their own cause until youth 
quickening into manhood, hath given them vigour and stability,” the statement read.54 Similar 
statements that highlighted the restraint and stoicism exhibited by westerners appeared in earlier 
petitions as well—likely to lend credibility to the movement by identifying it as a prolonged 
struggle that must soon be brought to a close. Delegates stressed the expediency of independence 
and called for the passage of an act granting as much at the next gathering of the legislature. 
George Muter and Harry Innes were charged to deliver the statement to Richmond and a similar 
address was drafted to the citizens of the district. Caleb Wallace and other members of the court 
party believed an independent Kentucky would soon be realized and began making preparations 
throughout the fall to form a new state government—a government in which they fully expected 
to hold key leadership positions.55   
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Reflection 
Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples aggressively competed for the wealth and natural 
resources of the trans-Appalachian West, and, by the mid eighteenth century, the region was 
consumed by unparalleled chaos. British officials struggled to maintain peace in the aftermath of 
the Seven Years’ War as the settlement and development of the trans-Appalachian West 
continued apace. Violent confrontations between Native groups and Euro-American settlers 
became commonplace and soon defined everyday life in the region. Violence, committed both by 
and against Native peoples, became a powerful unifying force for western settlers. Kentuckians 
looked towards eastern governments and political leaders for assistance as the frequency of raids 
against frontier settlements intensified after the outbreak of war in 1775. Most Kentuckians 
became disillusioned by the inability or unwillingness of the state and national governments to 
render assistance and some began to advocate separating from Virginia. These individuals 
believed that an independent state would best be able to secure the financial and military 
resources needed to ensure their protection. Delegates to the early statehood conventions focused 
on security concerns and land redistribution issues and framed the separation movement in terms 
of an East/West divide. Kentuckians, by speaking out against the Virginia and US governments, 
shaped state and national policies towards Native Americans and played an important role in 
identifying and critiquing the failings of the US government under the Articles of 
Confederation.56  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“Vassals to the merciless Spaniards” 
The prohibition of commerce on the Mississippi to the Americans has been a very wise measure, 
the more so that it has reserved for Spain the power to confer this inestimable privilege (which 
she may freely give) to a people who, if they enjoyed it without interruption, would not believe 
themselves compelled to any recognition.   
                                                                                              –James Wilkinson, first memorial, 178757 
Spain dealt a particularly heavy blow to the western economy on June 26, 1784, by 
closing the Mississippi River to American traffic. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their 
crops to market and expected the United States to quickly negotiate the reopening of the 
waterway. Kentuckians largely viewed the proposed Jay/Gardoqui agreement as a betrayal of 
their natural right to the Mississippi River. The framing of the statehood movement began to 
shift slightly from an East/West to North/South conflict as legislators from Virginia sided with 
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river. Spain intended to use western 
interest in the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States. The 
closure of the river, however, left Kentuckians in a unique position by placing them squarely 
amidst the competition between the United States and Spain for control of the region. This 
allowed some Kentuckians to leverage their allegiance to the United States in an attempt to 
obtain personal profit and/or regional economic and military support from either nation. 
Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive government and many, 
such as former Continental Army officer James Wilkinson, intended to take action.58  
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The River Closes 
The statehood movement took an unexpected detour on June 26, 1784, when Spanish 
officials closed the Mississippi River to American traffic. The river had been a source of 
consternation for the young republic since the United States achieved independence and signed 
the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Spanish officials did not endorse the agreement nor authorize the 
proposed boundary that separated Spanish West Florida from the rest of Spain’s trans-
Appalachian holdings. Spain refused to formally recognize the United States and the two 
countries were left at a stalemate. US officials demanded that the Spanish allow free and 
unobstructed navigation of the Mississippi River, grant trading rights to Spain’s South American 
territories, and agree to a formal boundary fixed at the thirty-first parallel. Spanish negotiators 
recognized that little would be gained from such an agreement and refused to concede to their 
demands. Spain feared the effects of a burgeoning republic on the fringes of its New World 
possessions and, like France and Britain, hoped to keep the young republic in a position of 
dependency. Spanish authorities regarded their trans-Appalachian holdings as a buffer for 
Spain’s valuable Mexican silver mines to the south. Preliminary negotiations between the two 
governments quickly stalled and it became readily apparent that a clear divergence had emerged 
between western and eastern interests in the United States. In fact, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the 
French minister to the United States, reported as early as 1779 that US officials were not fully 
devoted to ending Spain’s stranglehold on the western economy.59 
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Trans-Appalachian settlers had long relied upon the Mississippi River to ship their goods 
to market. River transport proved to be the lynchpin of the developing Kentucky commercial 
economy, although, after the closure of the river, shipments hinged upon the interpretation of 
imperial instructions by local Spanish administrators. Substantial portions of western crops were 
intermittently shipped downstream in lieu of Spanish regulations. The cultivation of Kentucky 
tobacco and corn, however, declined significantly because the difficult journey to Atlantic 
markets proved unprofitable and nearly impossible for Kentucky planters who were unable to 
ship their crops to New Orleans. Tobacco became an acceptable form of currency in 1787 as part 
of Virginia’s efforts to stimulate the western economy. The leaf was widely offered and accepted 
as payment of tax debt and eventually surpassed skins as the preferred currency in the region. 
Smallholders, though they did not wish to recreate the hierarchical social structure of eastern 
Virginia, also supported this move because tobacco proved to be so profitable.60  
Spanish Minister Diego de Gardoqui arrived in North America in mid-1785 with clear 
orders not to offer the Americans use of the river. He could, however, concede a boundary at the 
thirty-first parallel if absolutely necessary. Gardoqui, an experienced and highly respected 
diplomat, was well versed in American affairs. He served as an intermediary between US 
diplomat John Jay and Count of Floridablanca José Moñino Redondo during the American 
Revolution and intimately understood Spanish-American trade relations. Gardoqui’s arrival was 
highly anticipated by congressional leaders. “We expect him soon here so that we shall quickly 
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know whether he can or will do anything conclusive concerning the Navigation of [the] 
Mississippi [River],” wrote Virginian Richard Henry Lee.61 Gardoqui stressed the necessity of 
maintaining open negotiations concerning the river but remained acutely aware of the 
backcountry desire to obtain access to western waters, which he used as a powerful bargaining 
chip in negotiations with the United States. The Spanish plenipotentiary quickly confirmed what 
officials in Madrid anticipated. A clear separation of interests had emerged between the eastern 
and western United States.62   
Several issues lay at the heart of the national government’s reluctance to press for the 
opening of the Mississippi River. Western interests certainly did not take precedence during the 
American fight for independence and, after the war, eastern officials attempted to protect the 
young republic by mitigating unfettered western settlement. Gouverneur Morris, a New York 
statesman, explained that open access to the port of New Orleans would depopulate the East and 
strip its people of wealth. Virginia congressman William Grayson believed that “we [easterners] 
will lose our importance, and become as nothing in the scale of nations.”63 Prominent Federalist 
Rufus King cautioned his fellow members of Congress in August 1786. “Should we embarrass 
ourselves in the attempts of imprudent men to navigate the Mississippi below the northern 
boundary of Florida, we can expect no favors from the Spanish government.”64 King was likely 
referring to a limited trade agreement with Spain. Even some southern legislatures espoused 
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moderated and controlled westward expansion. These men joined with their northern 
counterparts to pass the Land Ordinance of 1785, the Indian Ordinance of 1786, and the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 in an effort to stem the growth of the nation.65 
On July 14, 1786, well over a year after the closure of the river, Gardoqui formally 
addressed Congress. The assembly appointed John Jay, of New York, as Gardoqui’s diplomatic 
counterpart, ordering him “to negotiate, treat, and sign with Don Diego Gardoqui…whatever 
Articles, Compacts and Conventions may be necessary for fixing the boundaries between the 
Territories of the United States and those of his Catholic Majesty and for promoting the general 
harmony and mutual interest of the two Nations.”66 Jay, then secretary of foreign affairs, was 
directed to obtain congressional approval of all agreements reached between the two men and 
instructed not to forgo navigation rights to the Mississippi River under any circumstances. He 
strongly opposed reopening the river because he perceived no commercial advantage in securing 
                                                          
65 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 40–41. The Land Ordinance of 1785 was enacted by the 
national government to measure and distribute land acquired from Great Britain via the 1783 
Treaty of Paris. The ordinance included the territory north of the Ohio River and east of the 
Mississippi River. See “An Ordinance for ascertaining the Mode of disposing of Lands in the 
Western Territory,” Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional 
Convention, 1774–1789, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, available online at 
https://www.loc.gov/item/90898223/ (accessed April 10, 2017). In August 1786, the national 
government enacted an ordinance to regulate the activities of Native groups. The act established 
three districts across the United States—each overseen by a superintendent who acted as a liaison 
between the Confederation Congress and Native leaders. See “By the United States in Congress 
assembled. August 7, 1786: An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs,” Documents 
from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, 1774–1789, Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC, available online at https://www.loc.gov/item/90898173/ (accessed 
April 10, 2017). The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established the Northwest Territory as an 
official territory of the national government and outlined a process for the creation of states. See 
“An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North–West of the 
River Ohio,” Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, 
1774–1789, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, available online at https://www.loc.gov/item 
/90898154/ (accessed April 10, 2017). 
66 Charles Thomson to John Jay, July 22, 1785, in Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to 
Congress, 22:526. 
36 
 
its navigation and actively lobbied Congress to revise his instructions. It soon became evident 
that gaining access to markets in Spanish South America was Jay’s ultimate goal.67  
Gardoqui and Jay settled upon a limited trade agreement that allowed for exchanges 
between the United States and Spain after Jay’s directions were modified in late 1786. However, 
the proposed settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the Mississippi River 
for a period of twenty-five to thirty years. Western leaders strongly opposed the agreement. A 
Kentuckian explained in December 1786 that “the late commercial treaty with Spain has given 
the western Country an [sic] universal shock, and struck its Inhabitants with an amazement.”68 
Less than two months later George Muter declared in February 1787 that he had “not mett [sic] 
one man, who would be willing to give the navigation up, for ever so short a time, on any terms 
whatever.”69 Kentuckians, particularly Muter and fellow court party members, were enraged by 
the closure of the Mississippi River and quickly elevated the situation to the top of their list of 
grievances against the national government. Spain, in closing the river, afforded itself yet another 
opportunity to preclude the development of the United States and stem the tide of western 
expansion. Spanish officials found themselves in a unique situation as the national government 
bore the brunt of the blame for the act. Spain could negotiate largely on its own terms with 
whomever it wanted. Spain’s willingness to hold talks outside official diplomatic channels was a 
significant boon to the Kentucky separatist movement. Spanish interest in the region presented 
an opportunity for some Kentuckians, particularly members of the court party, to leverage their 
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allegiance to the United States in an attempt to acquire the economic and military resources that 
the national government had so far failed to provide.70  
A New England Conspiracy 
The projected Jay/Gardoqui agreement fueled rumors of conspiracy and became a 
powerful catalyst for separatist movements across the backcountry. Some, like Louisville 
resident Thomas Green, proposed that western leaders take matters into their own hands, perhaps 
to force the national government to act. Green intended to raise a large number of troops and 
send them under the command of General George Rogers Clark against the Spanish at Natchez.71 
The men planned to settle the land they claimed in accordance with the laws of Georgia and 
hoped to gain the support of local Amerindian groups, who relied upon Spain for trade goods and 
supplies, by offering them provisions. In a December 1786 circular, almost certainly written by 
Green himself, the author described the shock experienced by backcountry residents as news of 
the Jay-Gardoqui agreement spread. Green questioned the legitimacy of the American 
Revolution in the West and cautioned against making westerners “vassals to the merciless 
Spaniards.”72 Westerners, he lamented, found themselves at the mercy of Spain once their goods 
were sent downriver to New Orleans—a sentiment shared almost universally across Kentucky. 
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Large quantities of produce were often confiscated by corrupt Spanish officials; at other times, 
Kentucky merchants were forced to sell their goods at low, non-negotiable prices.73 
 Green questioned the trade benefits that easterners hoped to reap from the proposed 
treaty and cautioned against losing additional European markets. “The Spaniards, from the 
amazing resources of this river, can supply all their own markets at a much lower price than you 
[eastern merchants] possibly can,” the author lamented.74 The final sentences of the circular took 
a much more radical stance. The author compared the relationship between westerners and the 
national government to that of the United States and Great Britain before the outbreak of war in 
1775. Green maintained that Great Britain was receptive to western overtures to rejoin the 
British Empire and threatened that the West would become a powerful force to reckon with in 
that event. The final line of the work succinctly expressed the sentiment of most backcountry 
residents: “these hints, if rightly improved, may be of some service; if not, blame yourselves 
[government officials] for the neglect.”75 Green was clear that Kentuckians would no longer 
tolerate a distant and unresponsive government: if US leaders didn’t act soon, westerners would. 
Great Britain and Spain found ample opportunity to exploit the tense political climate of the 
trans-Appalachian West and approached men like Green with tempting offers aimed at further 
                                                          
73 Thomas Green to Edward Telfair, December 22, 1786, in Green, The Spanish 
Conspiracy, 385–86; [Thomas Green?], circular dated December 4, 1786, in Green, The Spanish 
Conspiracy, 387–88. 
74 [Thomas Green?], circular dated December 4, 1786, in Green, The Spanish 
Conspiracy, 387. 
75 [Thomas Green?], circular dated December 4, 1786, in Green, The Spanish 
Conspiracy, 388.  
39 
 
alienating the western populace from the national government. Green’s warning suggested that 
some westerners might have been more receptive to those overtures than others.76  
Some well-known politicians from Virginia proper believed that the proposed forfeiture 
of the Mississippi River was the cornerstone of a northeastern plot to dismantle the national 
government and halt the expansion of the West. Congressman James Monroe, for example, 
asserted that long-term loss of the river would preclude the development of the backcountry by 
denying the existing southern states a clearly defined frontier. “The object in the occlusion of the 
Mississippi on the part of these people… is to break up so far as this will do it, the settlements on 
the western waters, prevent any in future [sic], and thereby keep the States southwd. as they now 
are,” lamented Monroe in August 1786.77 Former governor Patrick Henry fervently pushed for 
the opening of the river, no matter the consequences. “[I] would rather part with the 
confederation than relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi,” Henry declared in late 1787.78 
Others, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, feared total separation of the eastern 
and western United States. “If they [westerners] declare themselves a separate people,” warned 
Jefferson, “we are incapable of a single effort to retain them.”79 It was clear to Madison, 
Jefferson, and the others that the Mississippi River question was tied not only to the expansion of 
the West, but, by extension, the very balance of power that existed between the northern and 
southern states themselves. The development of the West and the formation of western states 
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hinged upon access to the Mississippi River. Securing the navigation of the river, in effect, meant 
an inevitable change in the power wielded by one bloc of states over another.80  
Kentucky delegates to the Virginia General Assembly drafted a memorial to the entire 
legislative body on November 17, 1786. The men expressed great alarm at the anticipated 
surrender of the river and explained that they hoped to “make known to the Legislature their 
apprehensions of the evils which must necessarily result from so unconstitutional and dangerous 
a measure.”81 The men stated that it was nearly impossible for westerners to find another route to 
get their produce to market because of the difficulty of the western terrain and explained that 
their livelihood depended upon access to the waters of the Mississippi River. The memorialists 
struggled to reconcile the images, symbols, and language of the American Revolution with the 
current situation in the West.  
“Born and educated under our common gov’t and attached to it by the strongest 
Ties of Interest & affection, having equally participated in the hardships & 
dangers of the Revolution and being equally entitled to its benefits, they 
[westerners] cannot but receive with horror the Idea of their being thus sacrificed, 
and their interests sold by those they have considered as their brethren, friends, & 
fellow-citizens,”  
 
the memorial read.82 The men questioned how the western populace would react when they 
learned that they had been denied access to the Mississippi River, not by the policies of Spain, 
but by their own government. Never in history has such an agreement been formed that “shut the 
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Doors of Commerce” to a portion of a country’s citizens for the benefit of the other, the 
memorialists lamented.83 “How subversive & abhorrent therefore must such a project be to the 
mild and free spirit of our federal constitution.”84  
In response, the Virginia legislature passed a series of resolutions in the final days of 
1786 that addressed the memorialists’ concerns. Navigation rights to the Mississippi River, the 
lawmakers concurred, should be considered “as the bountiful gift of nature to the United 
States.”85 The assembly maintained that the Jay-Gardoqui agreement did not align with the spirit 
of the country and stood as “a flagrant violation of justice… and an alarming innovation on the 
system of the Union.”86 A copy of the memorial was sent to Virginia’s congressional 
representatives in New York with instructions to oppose the passage of the Jay/Gardoqui 
agreement. John Marshall wrote of the resolutions: “the negotiation which has been opened with 
Spain, for ceding the navigation of the Mississippi—a negociation [sic] so dishonourable and 
injurious to America, so destructive of the natural rights of the western world, is warmly opposed 
by this country.”87 Marshall continued, explaining that “for this purpose the most pointed 
instructions are given to our delegates in congress. I persuade myself that this negociation [sic] 
will terminate in securing, instead of ceding that great point.”88 These resolutions likely helped to 
cool secessionist sentiment when details of the agreement reached Kentucky in early 1787. The 
Virginia legislature, for the moment at least, finally seemed in tune with the concerns of the 
western inhabitants. A slight shift in the framing of the Kentucky statehood movement began to 
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occur—from an East/West to North/South divide—as the separatist effort gained traction and 
centered upon a national government seemingly unconcerned with the Mississippi River and 
western trade. James Monroe later recalled that “the animated pursuit that was made of this 
object, required, and I believe received, as firm an opposition. The southern states were on their 
guard, and warmly opposed it.”89 
News of the Jay-Gardoqui agreement was slow to spread because of the limited reach of 
the early American media network, though it is highly likely that well-connected Kentuckians 
knew of the accord and the subsequent resolutions well before the details became widespread in 
March 1787. Court party leaders George Muter, Harry Innes, John Brown, and Benjamin 
Sebastian, ostensibly alarmed by the contents of the communiqué, hastily assembled and drafted 
a circular that was released to the general populace on March 29, 1787. The men called for an 
extralegal meeting, to be held in Danville on the first Monday in May, to discuss the most recent 
developments regarding the closure of the Mississippi River. Innes and his compatriots held high 
expectations for the impromptu assembly and prepared an equally ambitious agenda. Those in 
attendance were to prepare a remonstrance to Congress, establish a committee of 
correspondence, appoint representatives to confer with delegates of other western districts (if 
deemed necessary), and “to adopt such other measures, as shall be conducive to our 
happiness.”90 
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 Sebastian, Innes, and the others believed that forfeiture of the river would largely destroy 
the western economy and called for similar measures to be written across the backcountry. “This 
is a subject that requires no comment—the injustice of the measure is glaring—and as the 
inhabitants of this district wish to unite their efforts, to oppose the cession of the navigation of 
the Mississippi, with those of their brethren residing on the western waters,” the circular read.91 
The men again adapted the rhetoric of the American Revolution to frame their attack against the 
agreement. The resulting language effectively evoked the most basic principles of the 
Revolution—the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—while highlighting the 
disparity that had arisen between westerners and those very notions:  
we hope to see such an exertion made, upon this important occasion, as may 
convince Congress that the inhabitants of the western country are united in the  
opposition, and consider themselves entitled to all the privileges of freemen, and  
those blessings procured by the revolution; and will not tamely submit to an act of 
oppression, which would tend to a deprivation of our just rights and privileges.92 
Harry Innes anticipated the formation of an independent western government. “I am 
decidedly of opinion that this western country will, in a few years, Revolt from the Union and 
endeavor to erect an Independent Government,” he wrote in July 1787.93 “For, under the present 
system, we can not exert our strength, neither does Congress seem disposed to protect us.”94 The 
national government’s will and ability to adequately provide economic and security resources to 
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the West reached an all-time low with the proposed Jay-Gardoqui agreement, something that 
Innes and members of the court party hoped to exploit in order to hasten the separation process. 
These men reasoned that Kentucky should form an independent government and unilaterally 
separate from Virginia—with the implication that it may or may not join the union if Spain 
offered better terms (e.g., access to the Mississippi River). Court party leaders skillfully 
positioned themselves at the head of the Mississippi River question and hoped to use the issue to 
take control of the statehood movement.95   
For some, western independence was much closer at hand. James Wilkinson, an 
inveterate schemer, worked to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish empire in what became known 
as the Spanish Conspiracy. Wilkinson was born in 1757 and educated as a physician at the 
College of Philadelphia before departing for Kentucky in December 1783 as the spokesperson 
for Barclay, Moylan, & Co., a Philadelphia trading firm. Wilkinson hoped to leverage his 
allegiance to the United States (and that of his fellow Kentuckians) to obtain personal profit 
and/or regional economic and military support following the closure of the Mississippi River. He 
embarked for New Orleans in April 1787, and, once there, met with Louisiana governor Esteban 
Rodríguez Miró. Wilkinson formally outlined his plan to bring Kentucky into the Spanish empire 
in his first memorial before leaving for Charleston, South Carolina, later that year.96  
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Kentuckians, Wilkinson wrote, considered access to the Mississippi River an 
“indispensable” right and initially viewed the closure of the lower portion of the river in 1784 as 
a temporary problem—a formality in negotiations between the United States and Spain.97 The 
continued failure of Congress to secure that right, and Spain’s determined assertion of exclusive 
navigation rights to the river, “filled the new Settlements with anxiety, cooled the hopes of those 
whose aims were directed towards the west, and removed the motives that originated these 
settlements.”98 Wilkinson explained that, in light of recent developments in negotiations between 
the United States and Spain, “Kentucky is taking measures for its own safety” and has applied 
for separation from Virginia to form an independent state.99 “They [Kentuckians] establish 
circumstantially their right as a member of the federative Union and expressly declare that if 
Congress does not protect and sustain them in this desire it must consider the ties of their fidelity 
dissolved, they remaining at liberty to provide for their own conservation.”100  
Wilkinson believed it would be difficult for Spain to “perpetually resist” western designs 
upon the Mississippi River and questioned the practicality of an extended conflict with American 
settlers in the region.101 He estimated that upwards of ten thousand troops would be required to 
adequately defend Louisiana against American forces. “When Spain is exhausted of men and 
treasure, the Americans, like a detained torrent that has accumulated prodigious weight, will 
break all impediments, and desolating whatever they find in their path, sweep all resistance to the 
Gulf,” Wilkinson wrote.102 Wilkinson promoted Kentucky as “a permanent barrier” to the United 
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States and Great Britain and promised to sway Kentuckians to the Spanish crown. He maintained 
that Gardoqui must continue to oppose any agreements allowing for the opening of the 
Mississippi River to US traffic, explaining that: “the prohibition of commerce on the Mississippi 
to the Americans has been a very wise measure, the more so that it has reserved for Spain the 
power to confer this inestimable privilege (which she may freely give) to a people who, if they 
had enjoyed it without interruption, would not believe themselves compelled to any 
recognition.”103  
Wilkinson recognized that the closure of the Mississippi River was a political boon to 
Kentucky as well as to Spain. Spain’s actions positioned Kentuckians squarely between the two 
competing powers, and many, including Wilkinson, naturally hoped to benefit from that situation 
by leveraging their allegiance to the United States. Wilkinson, though he likely overstated his 
influence, was not alone in attempting to strike a deal with the Spanish government. Between 
1786 and 1795, at least fourteen western leaders entered into negotiations with Spain or another 
European power to separate from the union. Wilkinson and other western elites operated in a 
highly contested region amidst great political, economic, and social uncertainty, and, as historian 
Susan Gaunt Stearns rightly points out, their actions must be viewed within that context. That 
Spain was willing to negotiate with Wilkinson, outside official diplomatic channels, is 
illustrative of the influence that he and other western leaders wielded in the region and speaks to 
the importance of Kentucky, and the large trans-Appalachian West, in international matters.104  
For his services, Wilkinson requested a position within the Spanish government, a royal 
pension, and a western trade monopoly. “If this proposition is admitted,” Wilkinson wrote, “I 
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will be ready to receive instructions from the Government [Spain], and return to Kentucky by the 
shortest and surest route, and on the way I will establish a confidential correspondence near 
Congress that will regularly procure for me information as to all the measures that may in any 
way have relation with our affair.”105 Miró deferred Wilkinson’s request to Madrid, but granted 
him permission to sell up to $37,000 of produce in New Orleans. It took nearly a year to get a 
response from Spain and Wilkinson profited immensely from the trade deal during the 
intersession. Wilkinson’s scheme quickly unraveled, however, after secessionist sentiment 
cooled considerably following the ratification of the US Constitution in 1789.106  
Reflection 
The Mississippi River was an integral part of the developing western economy. 
Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their crops to market, and, after learning that Spain had 
closed the lower portion of the river to American traffic, expected the United States to quickly 
negotiate the reopening of the waterway. Most Kentuckians considered access to the Mississippi 
River to be a natural right, and were shocked when they learned that the proposed Jay/Gardoqui 
agreement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five 
to thirty years. The statehood movement began to be reframed as a North/South conflict after 
legislators from Virginia sided with Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the 
river. Spain hoped to use western interest in the Mississippi River as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with the United States. The closure of the river, however, elevated the importance of 
Kentucky and its peoples to both nations and allowed some Kentuckians to leverage their 
allegiance to the United States in an attempt to obtain personal profit and/or regional economic 
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and military support from either nation. Some Kentuckians, like Thomas Green and James 
Wilkinson, intended to take action when the national government would not.107  
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CHAPTER 3 
“Congress will never fail to find an excuse”  
There is reason to believe that the event may depend on the Kentucky members, who seem to lean 
more against than in favor of the Constitution. The business is in the most ticklish state that can 
be imagined. The majority will certainly be very small on whatever side it may finally lie; and I 
dare not encourage much expectation that it will be on the favorable side.  
                    –James Madison to George Washington, June 13, 1788108 
The national debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were shaped by 
the arguments made by people in the West. Many Kentuckians believed the new government 
would make it easier for the Atlantic states to cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain and 
questioned the rationale behind the new system. James Madison expected Kentucky delegates to 
play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to gain their support. 
Madison assured Kentuckians that navigation rights to the river would become a national issue 
under the new government and explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and enact 
laws that negatively affected the region. He also cited trade benefits for both the western and 
Atlantic states in his defense of the proposed government. Kentucky delegates, not actively 
participating in the convention debates, did not play the pivotal role that Madison expected. 
Kentuckians, nonetheless, played a significant role in shaping the new government by joining 
fellow westerners in demanding a government that was attentive and responsive to their needs. 
The Kentucky statehood movement was likewise shaped by the ongoing constitutional debates. 
Questioning what the new government would look like, and unsure if that system would be more 
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successful in meeting their needs, some Kentuckians began to see unilateral separation from both 
Virginia and the union as a viable option.109  
More Conventions 
 Kentuckians assembled in convention four times between September 1786 and November 
1788. Following the close of the third convention, George Muter and Harry Innes traveled to 
Richmond and diligently worked to ensure the passage of an act by the Virginia legislature that 
would enable Kentucky to separate. The duo met little resistance from the legislature and 
successfully secured the passage of the bill, which was approved by the House on January 6, 
1786, and the Senate on January 10. The legislation was known as the Virginia Enabling Act and 
was signed by the governor six days later on January 16, 1786. The act called for another 
convention to be held in Danville “to determine whether it be expedient for, and the will of the 
good people of the said district, that the same be erected into an independent state.”110 The 
legislation required that the September 1786 convention unconditionally accept all of the terms 
outlined within the document before a date of independence—after September 1, 1787—could 
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be established. Virginia legislators also stipulated that the national government admit Kentucky 
into the union and release Virginia from any pending obligations concerning the district before 
June 1, 1787. Elections were scheduled for August and those selected to attend the fourth 
convention were directed to assemble in Danville on the fourth Monday in September. Members 
of the country party favored the act because it protected their valuable land claims. The partisans, 
originally supportive of immediate separation, reversed their position and now began to oppose 
the movement once it became clear that a redistribution of western land would not occur. These 
men, growing more conscious of the power and influence Virginia wielded in national affairs, 
now began to claim that Kentuckians could only gain access to the Mississippi River by 
remaining tied to Virginia, with the full support of the state’s legislature behind them. Court 
party leaders were not satisfied with the document and lamented the scheduling of a fourth 
convention. Many within the group began to seriously consider unconditional separation from 
Virginia and it was at this moment that James Wilkinson became the face of the party.111 
 The delegates elected to attend the fourth convention met on September 26, 1786, but 
were unable to form a quorum for several months. Many of the men had embarked with 
Benjamin Logan and General George Rogers Clark to attack the neighboring Wabash and 
Shawnee tribes. The convention reconvened periodically throughout the fall of 1786 before a 
quorum was finally reached in January 1787. The Virginia legislature, however, passed a second 
Enabling Act in the meantime that called for another convention because the deadline of the first 
act had expired. The new legislation stipulated that separation occur no later than January 1, 
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1789, and that Congress grant its approval by July 4, 1788.112 The fifth Kentucky statehood 
convention convened on September 17, 1787, and by September 22 the delegates had accepted 
the terms of the Second Enabling Act. Harry Innes, Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and 
other leading members of the court party once again dominated the proceedings. Delegates 
requested that the state be quickly accepted into the Confederation and that Virginia send a 
member from the district to New York as part of the state’s delegation to Congress. Moreover, 
the fifth convention set an April 1788 election for delegates to attend a July constitutional 
convention, which would be tasked with writing a constitution for the new state. Most 
Kentuckians now believed that statehood was imminent.113 
 The sixth statehood convention, scheduled to convene in Danville on July 28, 1788, was 
dealt a particularly heavy blow when the Confederation Congress declined to admit Kentucky to 
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the union because a new federal government would soon come into existence under the 
Constitution of 1787. Delegates assembled at the statehood convention were shocked when news 
of the latest congressional action arrived. Court party leaders were frustrated that Virginia would 
yet again have to grant permission for the district to become an independent state. Caleb Wallace 
and James Wilkinson, among others, believed that the system was flawed and openly called for 
the convention to continue extralegally. Wallace declared “that it was the duty of this 
Convention as the Representatives of the people to proceed to frame a Constitution of 
Government for this District and to submit the same to their consideration with such advice 
relative thereto as emergency suggests.”114 Wallace may have perceived the situation to be a true 
emergency for Kentucky. Years of petitioning and assembling had yielded few tangible results 
and the Kentucky delegates now found themselves seemingly back at the beginning—a third 
Enabling Act would need to be passed by the Virginia legislature, another convention held in 
Danville, and a petition once again sent to Congress requesting permission to join the new 
nation. Though many court party members openly challenged the congressional decision, 
country party leader John Edwards supported the action and moved that the matter be referred to 
their constituents. One member of the partisans suggested that militia captains poll their men to 
gauge the public’s sentiment. However, the convention ultimately decided to assemble for a 
seventh time on the first Monday in November 1788. Kentuckians once again found themselves 
at the mercy of the Virginia state legislature and the national government.115  
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 The seventh statehood convention came at a critical juncture for Kentuckians. 
Secessionist sentiment undoubtedly ran high after Kentucky was denied admission into the 
national compact. Statehood proponents, especially members of the court party, found the 
western populace most receptive to unilateral separation from both Virginia and the national 
government. Caleb Wallace wrote in August 1788 that “our most discerning men are of opinion 
that Congress will never fail to find an excuse” to deny Kentuckians their sovereignty.116 
Members of the court, country, and partisan parties publically debated one another in the 
Kentucke Gazette during the weeks leading to the meeting. Partisan Ebenezer Brooks, writing as 
“Cornplanter,” cautioned that extralegal separation from Virginia would reduce the chance of 
gaining access to the Mississippi River. “Separation on any terms, especially if assumed without 
the concurrence of Congress, would be the most effectual barr [sic] against a free trade through 
the Mississippi,” Brooks argued.117 Brooks also considered the power and influence that Virginia 
wielded in national affairs and questioned the practicability of separation, pointing to “our 
present superior weight in the scale of Congress by our connection with the most considerable 
state in the Union.”118 Brooks and the partisans, still hoping to indefinitely postpone separation, 
spoke against the military efficacy of independence and argued that statehood would require an 
increase in taxation (via a general tax) to operate the government. Harry Innes and the court 
party countered that the movement was defined by strong public support and lamented that “the 
nose of the poor has been held to the grindstone of oppression in this District”—though neither 
the court nor country parties had been sympathetic to, and still continued to oppose, the partisan 
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cause.119 The convention had been granted broad powers by delegates of the sixth assembly “to 
take such measures for obtaining admission of the District as a separate and independent member 
of the United States of America, and the navigation of the river Mississippi, as may appear most 
conducive to those important purposes.”120 Moreover, the convention would retain power from 
November 1788 to January 1790 if another meeting needed to be called.121  
Delegates to the seventh statehood convention assembled in quorum on November 4, 
1788. Controversy arose when members of the country party insisted that the convention merely 
petition Virginia, yet again, to form an independent state. James Wilkinson, elected chairmen of 
the committee of the whole on November 5, maintained that the assembly was authorized to both 
declare independence and draft a constitution without any additional approval. Wilkinson and his 
associates sought to exploit the tense political situation and at least purported to steer the 
budding state into the arms of Spain. Delegates from Mercer and Madison counties delivered two 
petitions to the committee of the whole that implored the convention to draft “a spirited and 
manly address [that] should be sent to Congress, to obtain the navigation of the Mississippi.”122 
Members of the court party remained steadfast in their belief that only an independent Kentucky 
could secure access to the river, citing the abysmal failure of negotiations between the United 
States and Spain as proof. Wilkinson proved unable to sway the convention delegates despite 
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lengthy diatribes that highlighted the importance of the river to the district and outlined his 
involvement with Spanish officials in New Orleans. The Mississippi River, he exclaimed, was 
“the object upon which are based all hopes of worldly happiness, and without which poverty and 
misery will be their [westerners’] only fate.”123 He continued, “I speak with certainty when I say 
they will take up any proposition, no matter how desperate, in a cause of the utmost importance 
to them and their posterity.”124 Committees were organized on November 6-7 to draft addresses 
to both Congress and the Virginia General Assembly requesting Kentucky’s independence and 
admission into the union. Convention delegates scheduled an eighth meeting for July 1789. 
Complicating matters, the Virginia legislature passed a third Enabling Act four days after the 
Christmas holiday that was to be reviewed at the upcoming meeting. Kentuckians later learned 
that these terms were substantially different than those outlined in the second act and approved 
by the fifth statehood convention in September 1787.125    
A Nation Divided  
The national debates surrounding the ratification of the newly drafted US Constitution 
were affected by the tenor of the arguments made by people in the West. Members of the 
Danville Political Club scrutinized the new governmental system at their Saturday evening 
meetings and identified what they believed were deficiencies within the new plan. A number of 
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the club’s members, including Harry Innes, George Muter, Benjamin Sebastian, Samuel 
McDowell, and John Brown, questioned the role of the Kentucky militia in the new federal 
system. Club members were concerned that Kentucky’s militia units might be on expedition in a 
neighboring state and, therefore, unavailable to defend the state’s residents from Amerindian 
attacks. The president’s role in calling out the militia, the office of vice president, the omission 
of a declaration of rights, and jurisdiction over docks, arsenals, forts, and the new federal city, 
among others, arose as points of contention as well. Caleb Wallace, eager to promote Kentucky’s 
domestic manufactures, complained that “under this New Government Imports and Exports 
cannot be taxed nor prohibited without the consent of Congress.”126 Concerns regarding power 
and representation in the new government largely framed the members’ reading of the 
Constitution. Harry Innes noted the important role that he expected the Senate to play in 
maintaining the balance of power between the states. “Ninety-nine men out of a hundred 
possessed of power will abuse it. Without a senate, one State will have a power of imposing on 
another, one having a greater number of representatives. A senate in this case would be a very 
popular check.”127   
Kentuckians were largely suspicious of the proposed government and believed that 
ratification of the document would make it easier for the Atlantic states to cede control of the 
Mississippi River to Spain. The vote at the Virginia ratification convention—scheduled to begin 
on June 2, 1788—was expected to be decidedly close. Future Kentucky attorney general George 
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Nicholas wrote to James Madison on April 5, 1788, that “the only danger I apprehend is from the 
Kentucky members, and one consideration only has any weight with them; a fear that if the new 
government should take place, that their navigation would be given up.”128 Madison anxiously 
wrote to George Washington on June 13, 1788, that “there is reason to believe that the event may 
depend on the Kentucky members, who seem to lean more against than in favor of the 
Constitution. The business is in the most ticklish state that can be imagined.”129 
Madison bluntly addressed the Mississippi River question in debates about the new 
Constitution, explaining that the navigation of the river would no longer be viewed as a regional, 
but rather as a national, matter once the new government was in place. Madison assured 
westerners that the inclination of the Atlantic states to cede the Mississippi River would no 
longer be an issue. “If we try the danger to the Mississippi under the old and under the new 
system by comparing them in relation to their principle, the friends of the Mississippi cannot 
hesitate to embrace the latter,” he wrote.130 Madison believed that westerners would have a much 
more powerful voice in the new federal legislature, which required a simple majority to pass 
legislation. He explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and enact laws that 
negatively affected the region and also cited trade benefits for both the western and Atlantic 
states. Madison maintained that the reopening of the Mississippi River would stimulate the 
western economy and serve as a market for eastern merchants. He also reassured westerners that 
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all proposed accords required both presidential and Senate approval before any treaties, such as 
the Jay/Gardoqui agreement, could be enacted.131  
Madison and the Federalists eagerly awaited the start of the Virginia ratification 
convention in June and remained keenly aware of the important role that delegates from 
Kentucky were expected to play.132 Fourteen delegates represented Kentucky at the 
convention—the majority of whom opposed ratification. The Kentucky delegates did not actively 
participate in the debates and, in the end, did not play as important a role as expected. The final 
vote was eighty-nine to seventy-nine in favor of ratification. Three members of the Kentucky 
delegation—Robert Breckinridge, Humphrey Marshall, and Rice Bullock—voted with the 
majority. The other ten voted against ratification and one delegate, Noltey Conn of Bourbon 
County, either abstained or was not present for the vote. Madison had enlisted the support of 
Congressman John Brown in the months preceding the ratification convention to help secure the 
Kentucky vote. “I have written several letters since my arrival to correspondents in the district 
[Kentucky] with a view to counteract anti-federal machinations,” explained Madison in a letter to 
George Washington.133 “I have little expectation however that they will have much effect, unless 
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the communication they might call from Mr. Brown in Congress, should happen to breathe the 
same spirit.”134  
Brown had been appointed to the Virginia delegation to Congress in 1787 with special 
directions to shepherd Kentucky’s admission into the union. Diego de Gardoqui, hoping to draw 
Kentucky into the Spanish empire, propositioned Brown after Kentucky was denied admission 
into the national compact in July 1788. Gardoqui offered free and unrestricted access to the 
Mississippi River if Kentuckians agreed to separate from the union and appoint someone to 
negotiate with the Spanish government. Gardoqui recounted the meeting to his superiors in 
Madrid, noting that “I carefully observed his appearance as I told him this, and it seemed to me 
that I could discern the satisfaction it gave. He said he would reflect upon it and would see me 
and talk at leisure upon the subject.”135 Brown, writing to George Muter, outlined the offer and 
explained that “there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this declaration.”136 He implored 
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Muter and “a few confidential friends in the district” to “make a prudent use of the information 
which is in part confirmed by dispatches yesterday received by Congress from Mr. Carmichael, 
our minister at that court [Spain], the contents of which I am not at liberty to disclose.”137  
Gardoqui’s overture to Brown during the summer of 1788 underscores the political 
instability of Kentucky and the larger trans-Appalachian West during the 1780s. At this critical 
point—following the denial of the national compact by the Confederation Congress—
Kentuckians could have unilaterally separated from the United States and joined with Spain or 
Great Britain. Both hoped to stymie the development and expansion of the United States in hopes 
of furthering their own territorial and economic prospects in North America. Yet when James 
Wilkinson called John Brown to the floor of the seventh statehood convention (November 1788) 
to discuss Gardoqui’s offer, the congressman’s lackluster remarks largely turned the tide of the 
meeting and cooled any remaining secessionist sentiment. Many Kentuckians questioned the 
rationale for the new government, but most remained committed to the union. Despite some talk 
of secession from the United States, it was clear that an independent Kentucky would only exist 
as part of the United States. The only question remaining was, when?138  
Reflection 
Kentuckians actively shaped the national debates concerning the ratification of the US 
Constitution. Many Kentuckians believed that the new system would make it easier for the 
Atlantic states to forfeit the Mississippi River to Spain, and thus were suspicious of the proposed 
government. James Madison anticipated that Kentucky delegates might determine the outcome 
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of the vote at the Virginia ratification convention and worked to gain their support. Madison 
assured Kentuckians that access to the river would become a national issue, rather than a regional 
one, under the new government. He cited trade benefits for both the western and Atlantic states 
in his defense of the new system and explained that Congress would be less likely to develop and 
enact laws that negatively affected the region. The degree to which Kentuckians shaped the 
ongoing constitutional debates is significant. The important role that Kentucky delegates were 
expected to play, and the attention paid towards gaining their support, speaks to the reach and 
influence of Kentucky and its political leaders during the early national period. The Kentucky 
statehood movement was likewise shaped by the ongoing constitutional debates. Some 
Kentuckians began to see unilateral separation from both Virginia and the union as a viable 
option when faced with the prospect of a new and unfamiliar governmental system.139  
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CHAPTER 4 
“Injustice is necessary for our prosperity and happiness?” 
If slavery is not consistent with justice, it must be inconsistent with good policy. For who would 
venture to assert that it would be good policy for us to erect a public monument of our injustice, 
and that injustice is necessary for our prosperity and happiness? That old proverb, that honesty 
is the best policy, ought not to be despised for its age.  
       –Rev. David Rice, Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy, 1792140 
The final statehood conventions (numbers eight through ten) largely determined what the 
new Kentucky state government would look like. Kentuckians were particularly divided over 
which courts should hold jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. The right to hold slaves emerged 
as the most contentious issue discussed at the final statehood convention. Proponents of the 
institution argued that the Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the private property 
rights of slave owners. Convention delegates, in the end, voted to allow slaveholding in the new 
state, despite the efforts of an antislavery faction led by Presbyterian minister David Rice. 
Kentucky officially became a state on June 1, 1792, and a plantation and slave-based economy 
defined much of the state by the late 1790s. The integration of political and economic systems 
bolstered the gentry’s foothold in the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky 
frontier. Slaveholders across the United States gained an important victory with the ratification 
of the 1792 constitution—precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West.141 
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Statehood Achieved  
Delegates who assembled in convention on July 20, 1789, were largely inexperienced in 
state-making. More than twenty of those elected had never attended any of the seven previous 
sessions. Members of the court party were noticeably absent from the eighth convention after 
failing to win their bids for reelection; thus, the majority of delegates present represented either 
the partisans or the country party. Samuel McDowell, however, was once again elected president 
of the meeting and Thomas Todd resumed his post as secretary. The convention quickly turned 
its attention to the recently passed (third) Enabling Act and met as committee of the whole to 
examine the document. Isaac Shelby, who chaired the committee, addressed the convention on 
Thursday, July 23. Shelby explained that the terms outlined in the document were substantially 
different than those put forth in the Second Enabling Act and approved by the fifth statehood 
convention. The second and sixth articles of the document were quite different than those agreed 
upon in the second act: Kentuckians were to assume a sizeable portion of Virginia’s public debt 
and non-appropriated lands were to remain under the auspices of the Virginia government after 
statehood was achieved. The act also mandated that a date of separation could be set after 
November 1, 1790, if delegates to the eighth convention agreed upon the terms set forth and 
Congress consented to admit Kentucky to the union before September 1, 1790. The document no 
longer contained a joint committee to settle disputes between the two states. Delegates voted 
twenty-five to thirteen against the Third Enabling Act and resolved that the terms of the second 
act promptly be restored. A committee was appointed to draft a resolution to the Virginia 
lawmakers, and it was decided that the convention would reconvene following the modification 
of the act. Before the meeting adjourned, delegates were directed to record the population count 
of their respective counties and create precinct boundaries. The convention also passed 
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resolutions condemning inadequate frontier defenses and promoting domestic manufactures, 
likely an indicator of the continued interest in opening the Mississippi River.142    
The Virginia General Assembly passed a fourth (and final) Enabling Act on December 
18, 1789. The document remedied the criticisms leveled against the third act: Kentuckians were 
only required to cover a portion of the national debt (rather than the Virginia public debt as 
well); certificates issued after January 1, 1785, to finance expeditions against Amerindians were 
to be redeemed by Kentuckians themselves; and Virginia could issue warrants for Kentucky land 
through September 1, 1791, but could not reallocate unclaimed lands after May 1, 1792. The 
fourth act restored the six-member joint committee to settle disputes between the two states and 
called for the election of delegates in May 1790 to attend a ninth statehood convention, 
scheduled to begin in July 1790. An official date of independence (after November 1, 1791) 
could be selected by the convention so long as Congress consented to the move before that date. 
The ninth statehood convention was empowered to call a constitutional convention that could 
meet between November 1, 1791, and the actual date of independence. Delegates to the ninth 
convention, which assembled in Danville on July 26, 1790, wasted little time before agreeing to 
the outlined terms and conditions.143  
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Benjamin Logan and Isaac Shelby were the only members of the court party in 
attendance, and the assembly was again dominated by the country party. Though the partisans 
objected to the document (and to separation in general), the convention voted twenty-four to 
eighteen that Kentucky should join the union on June 1, 1792. The vote largely split along party 
lines, with members of the country party voting in the affirmative, effectively ending the partisan 
effort to derail the statehood movement. Plans for a state constitution advanced and by early 
1791 the debates regularly appeared in the Kentucky Gazette. Congress assented to the move on 
February 4, 1791. Fourteen days later it approved the Vermont statehood application, adeptly 
maintaining the delicate balance of power between the northern and southern states. Two main 
points of contention arose at the tenth and final statehood convention, which convened in 
Danville on April 2, 1792, to frame a government for the soon-to-be state. On the second day of 
the meeting, George Nicholas presented a series of resolutions that he intended to act as a 
framework for the new state government. Delegates were divided about which courts should hold 
jurisdiction over land-dispute cases. Nicholas believed the Kentucky Court of Appeals could 
most efficiently settle such cases and, therefore, should exercise original and final jurisdiction in 
those instances. The partisans saw this as yet another ploy to strip them of their land and objected 
to the plan.144  
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The right to hold slaves emerged as the most contentious issue discussed at the 
convention. African Americans had long had a presence on the frontier and played a significant 
role in the opening of the West. Slaves participated in western expeditions and faced the same 
challenges and dangers as their white counterparts. A 1777 census taken at Fort Harrod revealed 
that nineteen of the fort’s 198 inhabitants were slaves (seven under the age of ten). By 1790, 
approximately 11,830 African Americans (16.2% of Kentucky’s total population) peopled the 
area. Of the region’s 73,077 inhabitants, only 114 African Americans (0.2% of Kentucky’s total 
population) were listed as free blacks. Few Kentuckians owned slaves and even fewer of those 
individuals were considered planters (individuals who typically owned twenty or more slaves). 
Slaves were, on average, valued at nearly two or three times the annual income of most 
Kentucky smallholders.145 Some Kentuckians objected to the practice on a fundamental level, but 
many simply could not afford to become slaveholders. The majority of Kentucky’s slave 
population was concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest planters. These individuals, likely 
members of the country party, hoped to re-create a planter culture in the West that mirrored that 
of eastern Virginia. Kentucky planters often imported lavish goods, bred expensive horses, and 
built fine homes. Lexington quickly emerged as a bustling commercial hub as the gentry 
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strengthened their hold on the Kentucky economy. Opponents of slavery, however, threatened to 
halt the gentrification of the developing economic system.146   
Presbyterian minister David Rice, elected as a delegate to the tenth convention, led the 
antislavery faction.147 Rice spoke in favor of emancipation and called for the cessation of slave 
imports into Kentucky. “A slave is a member of civil society, bound to obey the laws of land; to 
which laws he never consented; which partially and feebly protect his person; which allow him 
no property; from which he can receive no advantage; and which chiefly, as they relate to him, 
were made to punish him,” Rice lamented.148 “He is therefore bound to submit to a government, 
to which he owes no allegiance; from which he receives great injury; and to which he is under no 
obligations; and to perform services to a society, to which he owes nothing, and in whose 
prosperity he has no interest.”149 Partisan leaders largely favored gradual emancipation—not 
immediate abolition—and believed that steps must be taken to phase out the institution while 
providing compensation to slaveholders. George Nicholas emerged as the chief proponent of 
slavery in Kentucky and argued that the Virginia Compact (Fourth Enabling Act) protected the 
private property rights of slave owners. Nicholas also believed that the new state government 
could not support widespread, compensated emancipation and feared the degradation of the 
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white populace through miscegenation. Despite the efforts of Rice and others, a plantation and 
slave-based economy defined much of the state by the late 1790s. The number of slaves living in 
Kentucky increased by 241 percent—a growth rate much higher than that of the general 
population—while the portion of slaveholders in the population modestly rose from 23.2 to 25.2 
percent during that time.150  
Kentucky officially became a state on June 1, 1792. Slaveholders across the United States 
gained an important victory with the ratification and adoption of the 1792 constitution—
precedent for the expansion of slavery into the West. Kentucky lawmakers reaffirmed that notion 
in 1799 when delegates to a second constitutional convention voted to strengthen the laws 
protecting the institution.151 Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi 
River and the port of New Orleans via the Treaty of San Lorenzo (commonly referred to as 
Pinckney’s Treaty) on October 27, 1795. The integration of political and economic systems 
bolstered the gentry’s foothold in the West and hastened the transformation of the Kentucky 
frontier. Lexington quickly became the economic and political powerhouse of the state, despite 
the city’s lack of a navigable waterway. The cultivation of hemp soon defined the Kentucky 
economy, and, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, over forty thousand pounds of raw 
fiber were exported to the lower South. Merchants, planters, and lawyers near Lexington 
understood the need to link private enterprise with public finance, and Henry Clay soon emerged 
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as the spokesman and champion of the developing Kentucky political economy—setting the 
stage for his American System.152  
Reflection 
The Kentucky statehood movement emerged at a critical juncture in the early republic’s 
history, and, when viewed in a transatlantic context, becomes much more important to the 
development of the United States and larger Atlantic world than what has generally been 
recognized. The intersection of the Kentucky statehood movement and the politics of the early 
republic underscore a number of political, economic, and social issues that defined the domestic 
and foreign policies of the United States as the untested national government struggled to assert 
its political and economic independence in the years following the Revolutionary War. 
Kentucky’s political leaders shaped the nation’s policies towards Native Americans, commerce 
and transportation, and territorial expansion while carefully attending to their own local political 
agendas. Kentuckians also played a critical role in reshaping the national government in debates 
concerning the ratification of the Constitution. The debates at the statehood conventions were 
likewise shaped by national and international issues, particularly Spain’s closure of the 
Mississippi River, further demonstrating the importance of viewing Kentucky, and the separatist 
movement, in a wider, transatlantic context.  
Statehood ensured that Kentuckians would play a much larger role in remedying their 
own economic, territorial, and security concerns—issues that the Virginia legislature and 
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national government had either failed to address or improve since the late 1770s. These issues 
mirrored those faced by American officials in the larger trans-Appalachian West as the United 
States struggled to secure sustained commercial and territorial development well into the 
nineteenth century. Although American officials hoped to bring stability to the region through 
diplomacy, they were often at odds with one another and the region’s leaders about how best to 
accomplish that goal. Kentucky lay at the center of a complex competition between the British, 
Spanish, and regional Indian groups to halt US expansion beyond the Appalachian Mountains. 
These groups hoped to stunt the growth of the United States and protect their regional interests 
by quashing its efforts to achieve sustained commercial and territorial development. The national 
government failed to implement basic measures that ensured the physical and economic well-
being of its outlying populace, and many, as a practical alternative, began to call for the creation 
of an independent western state. These individuals believed that their needs could best be 
addressed through localized government. Kentuckians assembled in convention ten times 
between 1784 and 1792 to discuss the possibility of separating from Virginia.153 
Kentuckians spoke out against the misappropriation of surveying fees, called for the 
establishment of a western printer, supported protection for orphans and the poor, and identified, 
in addition to a number of other issues, problems with the court system. They disapproved of the 
lack of navigable roads, bridges, and waterways in the region despite the sizeable share of taxes 
that Kentuckians paid to the Virginia state government. Most importantly, however, Kentuckians 
sought protection from antagonistic Native groups and spoke out against their inability to mount 
offensive strikes against them. Some Kentuckians began to question the legitimacy of the 
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American Revolution in the West and adapted the images, symbols, and rhetoric of the war to 
advocate separating from Virginia. The early statehood conventions centered on issues of land 
redistribution and security concerns and were framed by an East/West divide as delegates 
disparaged what they considered to be a distant and unresponsive state legislature. It was not 
until Spain closed the Mississippi River to US traffic in 1784 that the movement gained traction 
and began to be viewed as a North/South conflict, as legislators from Virginia sided with 
Kentuckians by calling for free and unrestricted access to the river.154 
The Mississippi River played a vital role in the developing Kentucky commercial 
economy. Kentuckians relied upon the river to ship their goods to market and expected the 
national government to quickly negotiate the reopening of the waterway. The proposed 
Jay/Gardoqui agreement merely heightened tensions in the region when word spread that the 
settlement called for the forfeiture of US navigation rights to the river for a period of twenty-five 
to thirty years. Kentuckians were no longer willing to tolerate a distant and unresponsive 
government, and some, such as Thomas Green of Louisville, threatened to take matters into their 
own hands. Even the ongoing debates concerning the ratification of the US Constitution were 
shaped by the arguments made by people in the West. Kentuckians questioned the rationale for 
the new government and believed the new system would make it easier for the Atlantic states to 
cede control of the Mississippi River to Spain. James Madison assured westerners that navigation 
rights to the river would become a national issue under the new government. He expected 
Kentucky delegates to play a decisive role at the Virginia ratification convention and lobbied to 
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gain their support. Kentuckians did not actively participate in the debates, despite Madison’s 
prediction, and the convention approved the new government in June 1788. Kentucky officially 
became a state on June 1, 1792. Kentuckians finally achieved unfettered access to the Mississippi 
River with the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty on October 27, 1795, and, by the late 1790s, a 
plantation and slave-based economy defined much of the state.155 
The Spanish Conspiracy once again attracted the attention of Kentuckians, or at least the 
writers of Kentucky history, in 1889 with the release of John Mason Brown’s The Political 
Beginnings of Kentucky—eighty-three years after the publication of Littell’s Political 
Transactions. Brown sought to clear his grandfather, the late Kentucky senator John Brown, and 
his court party counterparts (not including James Wilkinson) of conspiracy charges. He instead 
made a counter claim that country party leader Thomas Marshall had actually entered into 
negotiations with Great Britain. This was followed with the publication of Thomas Marshall 
Green’s The Spanish Conspiracy: A Review of Early Spanish Movements in the South-West in 
1891. Green, the grandson of Humphrey Marshall, argued against Brown’s findings and 
maintained that John Brown, along with Harry Innes, Benjamin Sebastian, Caleb Wallace, and 
James Wilkinson himself, were key players in the Spanish Conspiracy. Temple Bodley, a 
grandson of Harry Innes, closed the dialogue in 1926 with the release of his Reprints of Littell’s 
Political Transactions in and Concerning Kentucky and Letter of George Nicholas to his friend 
in Virginia also General Wilkinson’s Memorial. Bodley explained in an introduction to the 
material that even James Wilkinson was not involved in the conspiracy and maintained that he 
was more interested in undermining George Rogers Clark as commissioner of Indian affairs. The 
                                                          
155 Horsman, The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 16, 21–22, 64–65; Herring, From 
Colony to Superpower, 32, 47–48, 70; Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 40–45, 54–57; Aron, 
How the West Was Lost, 89–92. 
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work did little to sway readers on either side of the controversy but offered the first printed 
English translation of James Wilkinson’s memorial and expatriation declaration. Thus it would 
seem that Francois Furstenberg’s “Long War for the West” did not end in 1815 with the signing 
of the Treaty of Ghent, but, rather, continued into the twentieth century as the descendants of 
Brown, Marshall, and Innes struggled to reclaim the memory of the Spanish Conspiracy and 
Kentucky statehood movement.156  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
156 See Brown, The Political Beginnings of Kentucky; Green, The Spanish Conspiracy; 
Reprints of Littell’s Political Transactions; Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-
Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.” 
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APPENDIX B: BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KENTUCKY’S LEADING 
POLITICAL FIGURES 
John Bradford, of Fauquier County, Virginia, was born on June 16, 1749. Bradford moved to 
Kentucky in 1779 and began working as a land surveyor the following year. He was persuaded in 
1786 to establish a weekly paper and he, along with his brother, Fielding, traveled to 
Philadelphia to obtain the necessary supplies and equipment. The first issue of the Kentucke 
Gazette was printed on August 11, 1787. The paper published public announcements and 
advertisements in addition to local, national, and international news. He renamed the paper with 
the current spelling of the state in 1789. Bradford died on March 20, 1830. See Kleber, et al., 
eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Bradford, John,” for additional information.  
Ebenezer Brooks was born in Philadelphia in 1750, and, after studying divinity, moved to 
southwest Virginia by 1780. Brooks dabbled in a number of professions, including writing, 
teaching, ministering, and practicing medicine. He was a leading member of the partisans, and 
played important roles in the Kentucky statehood movement—first arguing for, and then against, 
separation. Brooks died on April 25, 1799. See James William Hagy, “Without a Proper Theatre: 
The Many Careers of Ebenezer Brooks,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 80 
(Summer 1982): 267–80, for additional information.  
John Brown was born in Staunton, Virginia, on September 12, 1757. Brown studied law, and, 
after moving to Danville, Kentucky, in the summer of 1783, served in the Virginia General 
Assembly as the Kentucky district’s representative from late 1783 to 1788. He represented the 
district in the Confederation Congress from 1787 to 1788 and as a member of the US House of 
Representatives (under the Constitution of 1787) from March 4, 1789, to June 1, 1792. Brown 
represented the state of Kentucky in the US Senate from June 18, 1792, to March 3, 1805. He 
died on August 28, 1837. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Brown, 
John,” for additional information. 
John Campbell, born in Ulster (northern Ireland) around 1735, had moved to Pennsylvania by 
1761. Campbell supported Virginia’s claim to the Pittsburgh area, and, in return, was jointly 
awarded four thousand acres of land near the falls of the Ohio River (present-day Louisville) in 
1773. He moved to the area in late 1782 and quickly became a leading political figure in 
Jefferson County. Campbell was a member of the partisans and was a delegate at the 1784 and 
1785 statehood conventions. He was a delegate at the 1792 constitutional convention and later 
served as a state senator from Jefferson and Fayette counties. Campbell died in 1799 at his senate 
seat. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Campbell, John,” and Watlington, 
Partisan Spirit, for additional information.   
Joseph Crockett, of Botetourt County, Virginia, was born on May 7, 1742. Crockett held 
various positions in the Continental Army before moving to Lexington, Kentucky, in May 1784. 
He worked as a surveyor for Thomas Marshall and was a member of the Virginia General 
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Assembly in 1786 and 1790. Crockett served as a member of the Kentucky House of 
Representatives from 1792 to 1795 and in the Kentucky Senate from 1800 to 1804. He died 
November 7, 1829, in Georgetown, Kentucky. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky 
Encyclopedia, s.v. “Crockett, Joseph,” for additional information.   
John Fowler, of Chesterfield County, Virginia, was born on April 27, 1756. Fowler attended 
William and Mary College and served in the Continental Army before moving to Lexington, 
Kentucky, in 1783. He represented Fayette County at the third statehood convention, was a 
delegate at the Virginia ratification convention in June 1788, and later represented Kentucky in 
the US House of Representatives from 1797 to 1807. Fowler died on August 22, 1840. See 
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Fowler, John,” for additional information.    
John Edwards, of Stafford County, Virginia, was born in 1748. Edwards moved to Kentucky in 
1780 and obtained title to nearly twenty-three thousand acres of land. He was a member of the 
Virginia General Assembly from 1781 to 1783 and again from 1785 to 1786. Edwards was a 
delegate at some of the statehood conventions and was elected, with John Brown, in 1792 to 
represent Kentucky in the US Senate. He held that position until March 3, 1795, and later served 
in the state senate from 1796 to 1800. Edwards died in 1837. See Kleber, et al., eds., The 
Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Edwards, John,” for additional information.    
Harry Innes, of Caroline County, Virginia, was born on January 4, 1752. Innes was admitted to 
the bar in 1773, and, after being appointed assistant judge to the supreme court of the Kentucky 
district in 1782, moved to Kentucky in 1783. Innes was a leading member of the court party and 
served as the Kentucky district’s attorney general from 1784 to 1789. He was appointed as 
Kentucky’s first federal judge on September 24, 1789, and served in that capacity until his death 
on September 20, 1816. See Tachau, Federal Courts, 31–53, for additional information.  
Benjamin Logan, of Orange County, Virginia, was born in 1743 and moved to Kentucky in 
March 1776. Logan became the first sheriff of Kentucky County, and, in addition to holding a 
number of military appointments, served in both the Virginia and Kentucky General Assemblies. 
He participated in the 1792 and 1799 Kentucky constitutional conventions, and later ran 
unsuccessfully for governor of the state in 1796 and 1800. Logan died on December 11, 1802. 
See Charles Gano Talbert, “Logan, Benjamin,” in Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky 
Encyclopedia, 566–67, for additional information. See also Charles Gano Talbert, Benjamin 
Logan: Kentucky Frontiersman (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962). 
Humphrey Marshall, of Fauquier County, Virginia, was born in 1760 and moved to Lexington, 
Kentucky, in the early 1780s. Marshall, a cousin of US chief justice John Marshall, worked as a 
deputy surveyor and eventually became one of the wealthiest individuals in the area. He was a 
member of the Danville Political Club, served in the Kentucky legislature in 1793 and 1794, and 
represented the state of Kentucky as a US senator from March 4, 1795, to March 3, 1801. 
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Marshall died on July 3, 1841. See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, “Marshall, Humphrey,” in Kleber, 
et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, 609–10, for additional information.  
Thomas Marshall, of Westmoreland County, Virginia, was born on April 2, 1730. He was 
appointed surveyor general of Kentucky County around 1780, and, after the division of that 
county, was appointed surveyor general of Fayette County in 1781. Marshall headed the country 
party and is best known for being the father of US chief justice John Marshall. He died in Mason 
County, Kentucky, on June 22, 1802. See Paxton, The Marshall Family, 19–23, for additional 
information.     
Samuel McDowell was born in Pennsylvania in 1735 and, at the age of two, moved with his 
father to Virginia. McDowell relocated to Lexington, Kentucky, in 1783 and began working as a 
surveyor before being appointed as a district court judge that same year. McDowell served as 
convention president at all but the first and ninth statehood conventions. He died on September 
25, 1817. See Speed, The Political Club, 56–59, for additional information.  
George Muter, of Orange County (now Madison County), Virginia, moved to Kentucky in the 
early 1780s. Muter was a member of the Danville Political Club and later served as the chief 
justice of the Kentucky court of appeals. See Speed, The Political Club, 47–50, for additional 
information.  
George Nicholas was born in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1754 and studied law at the College of 
William and Mary. He represented Hanover and Albemarle counties in the Virginia General 
Assembly before moving to Kentucky in 1788. Nicholas quickly became one of Kentucky’s most 
influential political figures and played an important role in shaping Kentucky’s first constitution. 
Nicholas died on July 25, 1799. See Andrew Cayton, “Nicholas, George,” in American National 
Biography Online, available at http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00246.html (accessed April 9, 
2017).  
David Rice, of Hancock County, Virginia, was born on December 29, 1733. Rice and his family 
moved to Kentucky in 1783 after receiving a petition, signed by nearly three hundred 
Presbyterian settlers, asking that he establish churches in their frontier communities. Rice owned 
slaves and, though he led the antislavery movement in Kentucky, did not free them until his 
death on June 18, 1816. See Salafia, Slavery’s Borderland, 46–48, and Ramage and Watkins, 
Kentucky Rising, 257–58, for additional information.  
Benjamin Sebastian was born in northern Virginia in 1745. He was educated as a minister and 
lawyer before coming to Kentucky in 1784. Sebastian was appointed as a judge to the Kentucky 
court of appeals in 1792. He resigned in 1806 following the formation of an investigative 
committee to examine his dealings with Spain. Sebastian died in March 1834. See Stephen Aron, 
“Sebastian, Benjamin,” in American National Biography Online, available at 
http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00281.html (accessed April 9, 2017).  
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Isaac Shelby was born on December 11, 1750, near Hagerstown, Maryland. He moved to 
Lincoln County, Kentucky, in late 1783 and soon became one of Kentucky’s leading political 
figures. Shelby was elected as Kentucky’s first governor on May 17, 1792, and served in that 
capacity until June 1, 1796. He was elected to a second term as governor sixteen years later and 
that time led the state from August 24, 1812, to September 5, 1816. Shelby died on July 18, 
1826. See Lowell H. Harrison, “Shelby, Isaac,” in Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky 
Encyclopedia, 815–16, for additional information.  
Thomas Todd, of King and Queen County, Virginia, was born on January 23, 1765. Todd 
studied law with Harry Innes, and, by 1784, had moved to Danville, Kentucky. He served as 
clerk at all of the statehood conventions except the first. Todd worked as a law clerk to Harry 
Innes, and then to the Kentucky House of Representatives, before being appointed to the 
Kentucky court of appeals in 1801. He eventually served as chief justice of the court and was 
later appointed to the US Supreme Court on March 3, 1807. Todd died on February 7, 1826. See 
Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Todd, Thomas,” and Edward C. O’Rear, 
“Justice Thomas Todd,” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 38 (April 1940): 112–19, for 
additional information.        
Caleb Wallace, of Lunenburg County (now Charlotte County), Virginia, was born in 1742. 
Wallace worked as a minister until moving to Kentucky in 1782. He began practicing law and 
was appointed as a judge to the supreme court of the Kentucky district on July 2, 1783. Wallace 
later served on the Kentucky court of appeals from 1792 to 1813. He died in Woodford County, 
Kentucky, in 1814. See Kleber, et al., eds., The Kentucky Encyclopedia, s.v. “Wallace, Caleb,” 
for additional information.  
James Wilkinson, of Calvert County, Maryland, was born on March 24, 1757. He was educated 
as a physician, and, after holding various positions within the Continental Army, moved to 
Kentucky in December 1783. Wilkinson was a leading member of the court party and at least 
purported to draw Kentuckians into the Spanish empire in what became known as the Spanish 
Conspiracy. He later became the senior officer of the US Army. Wilkinson died on December 
28, 1825. See Linklater, An Artist in Treason, for additional information.
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